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13 March 2014 
Dear Mr President 
Dear Madam Speaker 
The Australian National Audit Office has undertaken an independent 
performance audit in the Australian Federal Police titled Policing at 
Australian International Airports. The audit was conducted in accordance 
with the authority contained in the Auditor-General Act 1997. Pursuant to 
Senate Standing Order 166 relating to the presentation of documents 
when the Senate is not sitting, I present the report of this audit to the 
Parliament. 
Following its presentation and receipt, the report will be placed on the 






The Honourable the President of the Senate 
The Honourable the Speaker of the House of Representatives 
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Canberra  ACT    
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1. Australia’s  international  airports  are  important  transport  hubs  and 
commercial  centres,  through  which  millions  of  Australians  and  foreign 
nationals  pass  every  year.  It  has  been  estimated  that  in  2011,  Australia’s 
airports  generated  a  total  economic  contribution  to  Australia  of  around 
$17.3 billion.1 There are 177 ‘security controlled’ airports in Australia2, with the 
highest  level  of  security  controlled  airports  known  as  ‘designated  airports’. 
Currently,  there are 10 designated airports. Table S.1  lists  these airports, and 
the number of passengers using them in 2012−13. 







Adelaide 6 461 228 709 469 7 170 697 
Brisbane 16 622 408 4 547 234 21 169 642 
Cairns 3 640 188 515 971 4 156 159 
Canberra 3 013 960 0 3 013 960 
Darwin 1 612 007 313 032 1 925 039 
Gold Coast 4 922 763 882 536 5 805 299 
Hobart 2 026 551 0 2 026 551 
Melbourne 22 504 760 6 988 583 29 493 343 
Perth 9 090 604 3 741 600 12 832 204 
Sydney 24 984 961 12 633 127 37 618 088 
Total 94 879 430 30 331 552 125 210 982 
NOTE 1: Passengers includes both inbound and outbound but do not include charter or cargo-only flights. 
NOTE 2: Canberra and Hobart airports are configured to handle international passengers but do not 
currently do so. 
Source: Monthly Airport Traffic Data, Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Economics. 
                                                     
1  Connecting Australia: the economic and social contribution of Australia’s airports, Deloitte Access 
Economics, May 2012. 
2  The Secretary of the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development may designate an 
airport to be a security controlled airport which requires certain specified levels of security 
requirements. This may include screening and explosive trace detection. 
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2. The  Aviation  Transport  Security  Regulations  2004  (ATSRs)  require 
designated airports to have a counter terrorist first response (CTFR) capability3 
and provide  that members of a counter  terrorist  first  response  force must be 
either members of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) or the police force in the 
state or  territory  in which  the airport  is  located. This  requirement  recognises 
that  the  response  to  a  terrorist  attack  or  incident  may  require  the  use  of 
weapons and the power of arrest, which are only available to police officers.  
3. In  law  enforcement  terms,  international  airports  represent  a  complex 
and  evolving  challenge. As  the  events  of  11  September  2001  in  the United 
States demonstrated, they can be the source or focus of major terrorist attacks. 
Airports are the point of entry into Australia for criminals, potential terrorists, 
illicit drugs and other prohibited  imports with consequential  links  to serious 





4. Policing at airports  is currently delivered  through  the AFP’s Aviation 
function4 which is headed by the National Manager Aviation (NMA), an officer 
of Assistant Commissioner rank. At 15 November 2013, there were 618 sworn 
officers5  at  the  10  designated  airports  and  the  Aviation  function’s  2012−13 
budgeted expenses were $74.1 million.  
History of policing at airports 
5. Until  2005,  policing  of  airports  was  undertaken  by  Australian 
government agencies (the Commonwealth Police, the AFP and the Australian 
Protective  Services),  with  the  community  policing  elements  undertaken  by 
state  and  territory  police  forces.  Following  a  review  of  airport  security  and 
policing in 2005, a ‘Unified Policing Model’ (UPM) was introduced. Under the 
UPM,  the Australian Government,  through  the AFP, met  the cost of policing, 
                                                     
3  The ATSRs define counter terrorist first response as providing ‘deterrence measures designed to deny 
information to terrorists and deter acts of terrorism, and if an act is threatened or prospective, to deter 
or prevent it’. 
4  The Aviation function forms part of the National Security – Policing program. 
5  Appointees to uniformed components of the AFP are required to swear an oath (or make an 
affirmation) in terms prescribed by the AFP Regulations 1979 before they can exercise powers 
conferred on them by law. 
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328  officers  seconded7  from  state  and  territory  police  forces  to  deal  with 
community policing.  
6. Policing  at  the designated  airports was  reviewed  again  in  2009. This 
review (known as the Beale review) concluded that the UPM was flawed and 
recommended that all airport police officers should be sworn employees of the 
AFP  and  capable  of  undertaking  both  counter  terrorism  and  community 
policing  functions.  This  approach  was  termed  the  ʹAll  Inʹ  model.  The  then 
Government accepted  this  recommendation and  the process of moving  from 
the ‘unified’ model to the ʹAll Inʹ model was completed in June 2013. 
7. Under  the  National  Counter  Terrorism  Plan,  agreed  between  the 
Australian  and  state  and  territory  governments,  state  and  territory 
governments  have  responsibility  for  the  operational  response  to  a  terrorist 
incident  in  their  jurisdiction. Under  the  ʹAll  Inʹ model,  this  responsibility  is 
acknowledged in Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) between the AFP and 
the  state  and  territory police  forces, with  the AFP providing CTFR until  the 
relevant police  force  is  able  to  take  control  of  the  response. The MOUs  also 
allow  for  state and  territory police  forces  to provide operational  support  for 
non‐terrorist  incidents,  to be determined on a case by case basis.  In addition, 
should the need arise, the AFP could draw upon its own resources located in 
its main office  in  the state or  territory. These arrangements provide a  ‘surge’ 
capacity  for  the  AFP  airport  police  when  responding  to  major  incidents, 
whether or not they are terrorist‐related. 
Audit objective and criteria 
8. The  objective  of  the  audit  was  to  assess  the  AFP’s  management  of 





6  The role of PSOs is to keep individuals and interests identified by the Commonwealth as being at risk 
safe from acts of terrorism, violent protest and issues motivated violence. Their powers are more 
limited than those of sworn AFP officers. 
7  These officers were known as Airport Uniformed Police. 
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 appropriate processes  are  in place  for managing  risk  and operational 
planning; 






9. Australia’s  10  designated  airports  cater  to  more  than  125 million 
domestic and  international passengers annually. As both  transport hubs and 
major  commercial  centres,  the  airports  present  a  complex  and  evolving  law 
enforcement  environment.  Through  its  Aviation  function,  the  AFP  is 




model,  the AFP  is  effectively managing  the  delivery  of  policing  services  at 
Australia’s  international  airports.  The  transition  process  (known  as  Project 
Macer) was well managed and met  its objectives.8 As a  result of  the Project, 
274 PSOs  and  71  former  state/territory  police  officers  successfully  became 
sworn AFP  officers.9  The  Project was  completed  in  less  than  the  estimated 
five years and at a  cost of $16 million,  significantly  less  than  the anticipated 
$32 million. The  ʹAll  Inʹ model has delivered resource efficiencies resulting  in 
annual  savings  of  the  order  of  $10  million  (from  $84 million  in  2009−10  to 
$74.1 million in 2012−13).  
11. The organisational arrangements in place at airports are sound, with a 
clear  command  structure  at  each  airport  headed  by  an  Airport  Police 
Commander.  Internal  reporting mechanisms are  in place and  there  is a clear 
                                                     
8  The project’s objectives were (a) transitioning the Counter Terrorist First Response workforce from 
PSOs to sworn AFP members to provide a highly responsive, capable and homogeneous Aviation 
workforce and (b) transitioning from a hybrid Commonwealth/State and Territory model of Airport 
Uniformed Police (AUP) officers to a sworn AFP member workforce. 
9  A further 115 PSOs were redeployed to elsewhere in the AFP and 100 PSOs retired, resigned or 
accepted voluntary redundancy. 
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8  The project’s objectives were (a) transitioning the Counter Terrorist First Response workforce from 
PSOs to sworn AFP members to provide a highly responsive, capable and homogeneous Aviation 
workforce and (b) transitioning from a hybrid Commonwealth/State and Territory model of Airport 
Uniformed Police (AUP) officers to a sworn AFP member workforce. 
9  A further 115 PSOs were redeployed to elsewhere in the AFP and 100 PSOs retired, resigned or 
accepted voluntary redundancy. 
Summary 
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alignment  between  the AFP’s  strategic  and  functional  plans  and  individual 
airport  action  plans. However,  there  is  no  clear  linkage  between  the AFP’s 
planning  for  its Aviation  function and external assessments of  the  threat and 




the Aviation  function. An  explicit  assessment  of  the  inherent  security  risks 
presented  by  each  airport  and  the  nature  and  level  of  criminality  have  not 
formed part of that determination. The AFP advised that it is now developing 
a  resourcing  model  that  will  take  into  account  all  relevant  factors  in 
determining staffing levels at each airport. Completion and implementation of 
such a model would provide  the AFP with a more  rigorous and  transparent 
approach to resource allocation across airports. 
12. The AFP’s Aviation  function maintains a high operational  tempo. On 
average, in each year over the last three financial years, the AFP has dealt with 









respective  legislation,  the  duration  of  this  training  varies  considerably  from 
state  to  state,  and  from  zero  to  10  days.  There would  be  benefit  in  greater 







10  The AFP advised that while it was not aware of any specific reason for the increase in the number of 
arrests, it was possibly due to its change of focus from counter terrorist first response to the whole 
policing continuum.  
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function’s  strategy  for  policing.  The  AFP  has  now  agreed  that  it  will 




territory  legislation  provided  to  AFP  officers  by  the  respective  state  and 
territory police forces. 
Key findings by chapter 
Transition to a new workforce model (Chapter 2) 
16. At  the  time  of  the  Beale  review  in  2009,  there  were  225  Airport 
Uniformed  Police  (AUP)  officers  (that  is,  officers  seconded  from  state  and 
territory police forces)12 and 445 PSOs at the 10 designated airports. Under the 










11  The stated intent of the Aviation Doctrine is ‘to clearly outline the processes by which the AFP Aviation 
function focuses on anticipating and preventing unlawful acts or interference to aviation safety as well 
as preventing and defeating crime involving elements of the air stream’. 
12  As noted, states and territories had committed to providing 328 seconded officers. However, the Beale 
review noted that in practice, ‘some States have been unwilling or unable to provide agreed policing 
numbers’. 
13  Project Guild was used to manage the transition of protective service officers who were Air Security 
Officers (ASOs). ASOs are armed police officers who travel anonymously on selected domestic and 
international flights to provide security against any person or group who attempts to take control of an 
aircraft or to cause death or serious injuries to passengers or crew. 
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17. A major  component of  these projects was providing  training  to  those 
officers who wanted  to make  the  transition  to  fully sworn AFP officers. AFP 
training is undertaken at the AFP College in Barton, ACT. In recognition of the 
fact that officers already had experience working in the airport environment or 
as  officers  of  state  or  territory  police  forces,  the AFP modified  its  standard 
recruit training program to recognise this prior learning. 








to  $74.1 million  in  2012−13.14  Other  benefits  include  a  single  command 
structure,  improved  stakeholder  engagement,  resource  efficiencies  and 
development of policing skills. 
20. AFP officers at airports use and apply both Commonwealth and state 
and  territory  legislation  and  powers. Across  the  10  airports,  there  are more 
than  400  relevant  provisions  of  Commonwealth  legislation  and  some 
300 relevant  pieces  of  state  or  territory  legislation.  While  Commonwealth 
legislation contains provisions to deal with the most serious types of offences 
(such  as murder  and  terrorism  related  offences), most  ‘community policing’ 
powers and offences are found in state and territory legislation.  
21. The  AFP  provides  its  officers  with  training  in  relation  to 
Commonwealth  legislation. Training  in relevant state and territory  legislation 
is  provided  by  the  police  force  in  each  jurisdiction  in  accordance  with 
agreements between  the AFP and each state and  territory police  force. There 
was significant variation in the duration of this training, varying from none in 
Queensland to 10 days  in Western Australia. The duration and content of the 
training  provided  is  ultimately  a  matter  for  the  respective  police  forces. 
However,  there  is  scope  for  the AFP  to  approach  state  and  territory  police 
forces  with  a  view  to  jointly  reviewing  the  training  provided  by  each 
                                                     
14  Notwithstanding this reduction, the Aviation function has consistently met its targets for its Key 
Performance Indicators (KPIs) (see paragraph 4.21) 
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jurisdiction  in  order  to  achieve  greater  consistency  and  better  support  for 
airport officers. 
Management of AFP Airport Operations (Chapter 3) 
22. At each of the 10 designated airports, AFP officers are commanded by 
an  Airport  Police  Commander  (APC).  There  are  a  range  of  internal  and 
external committees at both the local and national levels in which the AFP is a 





alignment  between  internal  AFP  planning  documents,  there  is  little 




AFP  is  responsible  for  resourcing each airport. Currently,  there  is no explicit 
model  for determining  the AFP’s  overall  resource  allocation  to  the Aviation 
function nor relative resourcing  levels at  the  individual airports, based on an 
assessment of risks.  




the  Aviation  function.  In  response  to  the  audit,  the  AFP  advised  that  it  is 
developing a  resourcing model  that will also  take  into account  risks,  threats, 
levels of criminality, passenger and aircraft movements and airport geospatial 
data.18  The  completion  and  implementation  of  this model would  provide  a 
                                                     
15  Brisbane, Cairns, Canberra, Darwin, Gold Coast and Perth. 
16  Examples of the major risks to the airports include: reduced capacity to deliver CTFR and community 
policing functions, failure to deliver competent and qualified sworn members with the requisite 
knowledge, both Commonwealth and state and territory, to perform the policing at airport function and 
a failure to adequately deal with state-based offences. 
17  The relevant division in the Department of Industry and Regional Development is the Office of 
Transport Security. 
18  For example, Perth airport has four terminals some distance apart. The staffing required to respond to 
incidents at any or all of the terminals is commensurately greater than for an airport with fewer 
terminals. 
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In  this  context,  there  would  be  value  in  the  AFP  drawing  upon  work 
undertaken in 2010 by DIRD to assess the threat and risk environment at each 
of the 10 designated airports 
24. Under  the  terms  of  the  2005  Council  of  Australian  Governments 
(COAG) agreement, state and  territory police  forces agreed  to provide police 
officers  to  participate  in  Joint Airport  Intelligence Groups  (JAIGs)  and  Joint 
Airport  Investigation  Teams  (JAITs).19  In  practice,  state  and  territory  police 
forces have not consistently provided these resources: in 2012−13, only four of 
10  state/territory police  forces  fully met  the commitment with  the equivalent 
number  for  JAITs  being  two  of  five.  Given  the  agreements  between 
governments on these matters, there would be benefit in the AFP continuing to 
work  with  state  and  territory  police  forces  to  address  these  shortfalls  in 
resource commitments.  
25. The AFP’s  Intelligence  function has  intelligence analysts embedded  in 
JAIGs  at  each  airport  and  these  arrangements  are  well  established. 
The Intelligence function produces a range of useful strategic, operational and 
tactical  intelligence  products  which  relate  to  the  AFP’s  counter  terrorist, 
serious  and  organised  crime  and  community  policing  roles  at  the  airports. 
ANAO  examination  of  the  Intelligence  function’s  fortnightly  aviation 
significant operations  reports  for 2012−13 demonstrated  that  the work of  the 
JAIGs leads to practical outcomes, including arrests, summonses and cautions. 
The Aviation Function’s Performance (Chapter 4) 
26. The  AFP  collects  workload  statistics  relating  to  the  incidents  it 
responds to at airports and the outcome of these incidents (which may include 
no  further  action,  apprehension  or  arrest).  Over  the  three years  between 
2010−11  and  2012−13,  AFP  statistics  show  that  officers  attended  63  437 
incidents and made 7864 apprehensions and 935 arrests at  the 10 designated 
airports. The number of arrests made at  the 10 designated airports  increased 
by  42.6  per  cent  over  the  three  year  period  from  July  2010  to  June 2013.20 
                                                     
19  JAIGs are located at all of the designated airports: JAITs are located at Adelaide, Brisbane, 
Melbourne, Perth and Sydney airports. 
20  The AFP advised that while it was not aware of any specific reason for the increase in the number of 
arrests, it was possibly due to its change of focus from counter terrorist first response to the whole 
policing continuum. 
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Dealing  with  unattended  items  was  the  most  common  type  of  incident, 
accounting for almost 16 per cent of all incidents attended. 
27. All  Australian  government  agencies  are  required  to  have  key 
performance  indicators  (KPIs) which are  intended  to allow an assessment of 
how the agency is delivering the outcomes required of it by government. The 
Aviation function has three KPIs covering the level of community and business 
confidence,  the  proportion  of  time  spent  in  high‐visibility  policing  and  its 
ability to meet specified response times. Whilst the KPIs relating to community 




for  the AFP  to consider  the  introduction of measures which better assess  the 
Aviation function’s performance. 
28. Measurement  of  the  effectiveness  of  the  AFP’s  aviation  function  is 
inherently difficult.21 However,  each year,  the AFP  conducts  a  survey of  the 
Aviation  function’s  clients  (the  Business  Satisfaction  Survey  (BSS))  and  a 
survey of airport users  (the Airport Consumer Confidence Survey  (ACCS)).22 
Both  surveys  show  consistently high  levels  of  satisfaction with  the Aviation 
function. The 2013 BSS found that 96 per cent of respondents were satisfied (or 
very satisfied) with  their most recent dealings with  the Aviation  function. Of 
the respondents to the ACCS, 86 per cent said that they were satisfied (or very 
satisfied) with  the  contribution  that  the Aviation  function makes  to  aviation 
law enforcement. 
29. Among the AFP’s stakeholders, two of the most important in relation to 
day  to day operations are  the airport operators and  the  state/territory police 
forces.  The  ANAO  wrote  to  all  10  airport  operators  and  to  the 
                                                     
21  The Australian Institute of Criminology has commented that ‘…there neither exists nor can there exist 
a single measure of police performance. Rather, it is appropriate to select from a variety of measures 
those which focus upon that specific element of police activity one wishes to evaluate’. (Australian 
Institute of Criminology, Efficiency and Effectiveness in Australian Policing, Canberra, December 
1988.) In the Australian Capital Territory, ACT Policing uses 33 Key Performance Indicators to report 
to the ACT Government on its performance. (See ANAO Audit Report No.13 2012–13, The Provision 
of Policing Services to the Australian Capital Territory.) 
22  The 2013 ACCS involved a face-to-face survey of almost 2 000 domestic and international travelers. 
Less than 0.5 per cent of respondents refused to participate. The 2013 BCS involved a survey by 
email of 261 people who had had dealings with the Aviation function. The response rate was 
49.4 per cent. 
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seven state/territory  police  forces  and  met  with  representatives  of  airport 
operators and police forces in New South Wales, Queensland and the Northern 
Territory.  All  seven  state/territory  police  forces  stated  that  they  had  good 
working  relationships  and  did  not  identify  any  significant  operational, 
jurisdictional, legislative or other impediments to effective policing at airports.  
30. Representatives of the six airport operators who replied to the ANAO’s 
letter  (or met with  the audit  team)  reported  that  they had  effective working 
relationships  with  the  AFP.  However,  representatives  of  three  operators 
(50 per  cent)  stated  that  they  did  not  have  a  clear  understanding  of  the 
Aviation  function’s strategy  for airport policing. In response  to  this  feedback, 
the AFP has agreed to disseminate its Aviation Doctrine. Among other things, 
the Doctrine  identifies  types of criminal  threats and critical points at airports 
and details a number of prevention, response and special operations that may 
be conducted.  
31. During  the period 2010−11  to 2012−13, a  total of 140 complaints were 
reported  as  being  made  about  AFP  officers  at  airports.23  The  number  of 
complaints decreased by 37 per  cent  from 57  in 2010−11  to 36  in 2012−13.  In 
2012−13,  a  total  of  69  ‘conduct  issues’  were  ‘established’  or  substantiated. 
Although discourtesy  accounted  for  seven of  the  established  conduct  issues, 
the  largest single type of conduct  issues was  ‘fail to comply with direction or 
procedure’  (18  issues),  where  the  ‘complainant’  was  in  fact  another  AFP 
officer.  In 2012−13,  the overall number of complaints and associated conduct 
issues  arising  at  airports  (36  and  62  respectively)  compared  favourably with 






sample  of  183  investigations  across  the  AFP  that  he  examined,  with  one 
                                                     
23  Complaints received are categorised into four categories with Category One being the least serious 
and Category Four being allegation of corruption. Category One and Two complaints are referred to a 
Complaint Management Team in the functional area for investigation and reporting back to the central 
Professional Standards unit. Category Three complaints are investigated by the Professional 
Standards unit and Category Four complaints are referred to the Australian Commissioner for Law 
Enforcement Integrity. A complaint may raise more than one issue: the 140 complaints made in the 
period 2010–11 to 2012–13 included 263 ‘conduct issues’.  
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exception,  complaint  investigations had been  reasonably  conducted and  that 
the outcomes of complaints were also reasonable. 
Summary of agency responses 
33. The  AFP  provided  the  following  summary  comment  to  the  audit 
report: 
The AFP welcomes  the opportunity  to contribute  to  the ANAO Performance 
Audit,  Policing  at  Australian  International  Airports  and  acknowledges  the 
commentary  provided  within  the  report.  The  AFP  agrees  with  the 
recommendation contained therein.  
34. The AFP’s full response is included at Appendix 1. 
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To  enable  AFP  officers  to  maintain  appropriate 
knowledge  of  state  and  territory  legislative 
requirements,  the ANAO  recommends  that  the AFP,  in 
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1. Background and Context 





law enforcement agency.  Its  responsibilities  include  the provision of policing 
services  in  relation  to Commonwealth  laws  and  property  and  safeguarding 
Commonwealth  interests,  including  the  provision  of  policing  services  at 
Australian international airports. 
1.2 In  law  enforcement  terms,  international  airports  represent  a  complex 
challenge.  As  the  events  of  September  11  2001  in  the  United  States 
demonstrated,  they can be  the source or  focus of major  terrorist attacks, with 
the  potential  to  kill  or  injure  thousands  of  people. Airports  are  one  of  the 
points of entry into Australia for criminals, potential terrorists, illicit drugs and 
other  prohibited  imports with  consequential  links  to  serious  and  organised 
crime both internationally and domestically. Parents involved in child custody 
disputes may  also  seek  to  remove  children  from Australia  via  international 
airports. Also,  the  trend  towards  the development of airports as major  retail 
centres provides a vulnerability  for  lower‐level crime such as shoplifting and 




of  aircraft  accommodated  (including  whether  they  are  domestic  or 
international)  and  the  potential  impact  of  a  terrorist  attack.  The  Aviation 
Transport  Security  Act  2004  (ATSA)  and  Aviation  Security  Regulations  2005 
(ASRs)  has  created  a  regulatory  framework  for  the  prevention  of  unlawful 
interference  to  aviation.24  The  Secretary  of  the Department  of  Infrastructure 
                                                     
24  The ATSA and ASRs, as well as other legislation, give domestic legal effect to Australia’s ratification 
of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (the Chicago Convention), to which Australia became 
a signatory in 1947. Annex 17 to the Convention established minimum aviation security measures with 
which signatories to the Convention must apply. 
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as  a  security  controlled  airport.25  Australia  currently  has  177  security 
controlled airports. 
1.4 There  are  seven  categories  of  security  controlled  airports.26 
The operators  of  these  airports  are  required  to  have  a  Transport  Security 
Program  (TSP)  approved  by  the Department  of  Infrastructure  and Regional 
Development. TSPs contain information such as a statement outlining the local 
security risk context, details of controls in relation to access to secure areas of 
the  airport,  passenger  and  baggage  screening  and  security  measures.27 
Category One airports require the highest levels of security screening.  
1.5 The ASRs also establish certain airports as ‘designated airports’. These 
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25  Aviation Transport Security Act 2004, s28. 
26  Categories One and Two comprise international airports with 50 000 or more departing passengers 
per year, including Adelaide, Brisbane, Cairns, Canberra, Darwin, Gold Coast, Hobart, Melbourne, 
Perth and Sydney. Category Seven includes domestic airports which have a small number of 
passengers and open charter flights, and do not require screening infrastructure. There are currently 
no airports in Category Seven. The level of security screening required also varies between 
categories.  
27  Details of what is required in a TSP are available at 
 <http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/transport/security/aviation /tsp/aircraft.aspx>.       
28  The National Counter Terrorism Plan, agreed between the Australian and state and territory 
governments, recognises that state and territory governments have primary responsibility for the 
operational response to a terrorist incident in their jurisdiction. In the airport context, police at airports 
have responsibility for the first response to a terrorism incident (such as containment and evacuation 
of people) – known as Counter Terrorist First Response - until the relevant state or territory police 
force takes operational control. 
29  The Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Economics collects passenger data from all 
airports servicing Regular Public Transport (RPT) flights which received more than 7 000 passengers 
in 2012. This accounted for 104 of the 177 security controlled airports. 
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Adelaide 6,461,228 709,469 7,170,697 
Brisbane 16,622,408 4,547,234 21,169,642 
Cairns 3,640,188 515,971 4,156,159 
Canberra 3,013,960 0 3,013,960 
Darwin 1,612,007 313,032 1,925,039 
Gold Coast 4,922,763 882,536 5,805,299 
Hobart 2,026,551 0 2,026,551 
Melbourne 22,504,760 6,988,583 29,493,343 
Perth 9,090,604 3,741,600 12,832,204 
Sydney 24,984,961 12,633,127 37,618,088 
Total 94,879,430 30,331,552 125,210,982 
NOTE 1: Passengers include both inbound and outbound but do not include charter or cargo-only flights. 
NOTE 2: Canberra and Hobart airports are configured to handle international passengers but do not 
currently do so. 








 by  facilitating  international  tourism,  airports  contribute  to  a  tourist 
industry which employs 400 000 people and contributes $34.6 billion to 
the economy; and 





30  Connecting Australia: the economic and social contribution of Australia’s airports, Deloitte Access 
Economics, May 2012. 
  
ANAO Audit Report No.23 2013–14 
Policing at Australian International Airports 
 
32 
Table 1.2: Forecast growth in passenger numbers (domestic and 
international) at the 10 designated airports 2010−11 to 
2030−31 












Adelaide 7.3 13.5 84.9 3.1 
Brisbane  19.9 45.1 126.6 4.2 
Cairns 3.9 8.0 106.1 3.7 
Canberra 3.2 6.1 90.6 3.3 
Darwin 1.8 4.2 133.3 4.2 
Gold Coast 5.5 13.1 138.2 4.4 
Hobart 1.9 3.5 84.2 3.0 
Melbourne 28.0 60.4 115.7 3.9 
Perth 10.9 25.7 135.8 4.4 
Sydney 35.8 72.0 101.1 3.6 
Total 118.2 251.6 112.9 3.7 
Source: Air passenger movements through capital and non-capital airports to 2030−31, Research 
Report 133, Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Economics, 2012. 
1.8 Policing at airports  is currently delivered  through  the AFP’s Aviation 
function which is headed by the National Manager Aviation (NMA), an officer 
of Assistant Commissioner rank. At 15 November 2013, there were 618 sworn 
officers31  at  the  10  designated  airports  and  the  Aviation  function’s  2012−13 
budgeted expenses were $74.1 million. 
History of policing at designated airports 




31  Appointees to uniformed components of the AFP are required to swear an oath (or make an 
affirmation) in terms prescribed by the AFP Regulations 1979 before they can exercise powers 
conferred on them by law. 
32  Cairns airport was owned by the Cairns Port Authority until December 2008, when it was sold to a 
private consortium. 
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is  now  leased  to  private  companies.33  Plain  clothed  Commonwealth  Police 
officers policed Sydney and Melbourne airports when they opened in the 1960s 
and  other  major  airports  as  they  opened.  In  December  1974,  the  then 
Australian Government decided that security at the designated airports should 
be upgraded. Until  2005, policing  of  airports was undertaken  by Australian 
government  agencies  (the  Commonwealth  Police,  the  AFP  and  Australian 
Protective  Services),  with  the  community  policing  elements  undertaken  by 
state and territory police forces. 
Reviews of airport security and policing 
The Wheeler Review 
1.10 Between  October  2004  and  May  2005,  a  number  of  events  led  to 
significant  community  concern  about  reported  instances  of  criminality  and 
security weaknesses  at major  airports  such  as Sydney.  In  response,  the  then 
Deputy  Prime  Minister  and  Minister  for  Transport  commissioned  Sir  John 
Wheeler34 to undertake an independent review of airport security and policing. 
The  Wheeler  review,  which  was  released  by  the  then  Prime  Minister  in 
September 2005, was highly  critical of  security and policing arrangements at 
Australia’s airports. Among his findings were: 
 Bluntly  put,  in  the  everyday workings  of  airports,  no  one  is  taking 
overall charge of policing and security; 
 Policing  at  major  airports  in  Australia  is  often  inadequate  and 
dysfunctional, and security systems are  typically uncoordinated. The 
roots  of  this  include  bureaucratic  turf  protection  and  unresolved 
Commonwealth/State conflicts over resources; and 
 The  present  system  of  information  sharing  in  and  around  aviation 
security is completely inadequate for the demands of our time.35  
1.11 The Wheeler review made 17 recommendations, including that at each 
of  the  designated  airports,  a  position  of  Airport  Police  Commander  be 
                                                     
33  The Australian Government announced in April 1994 that it would privatise all 22 airports then owned 
by the Australian Government by selling leases for each airport. The land on which airports (except 
Cairns) are situated remains in Australian Government ownership. The sales occurred between July 
1997 and December 2003 and raised more than $8.5 billion.  
34  Sir John Wheeler was a former UK Cabinet Minister who had undertaken a review of security 
arrangements at British airports. 
35  The Rt Hon Sir John Wheeler DL, An Independent Review of Airport Security and Policing for the 
Government of Australia, September 2005, pp. xi, 40, 51. 
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established and  that  funding responsibility  for all aspects of policing at  these 
airports should rest with the AFP. 
1.12 Following  a  meeting  of  the  Council  of  Australian  Governments 
(COAG),  the  then Prime Minister  announced on  27 September  2005  that  the 
Australian  and  state  governments  had  agreed  to  the  Wheeler  review 
recommendations  and,  in  particular,  the  introduction  of  a  Unified  Policing 
Model  (UPM)  (also  known  as  the  hybrid model). Under  the  agreement,  the 
states and territories would provide 328 police officers who would ‘wear AFP 
uniform’. The AFP would pay  the  state  and  territory police  forces  for  these 
officers,  including  their  salary,  superannuation, other overhead  costs and  an 
administration fee. As a consequence, the workforce at airports comprised AFP 
Protective  Service  Officers  (PSOs)36  and  Airport  Uniformed  Police  (AUP) 
officers  who  were  sworn  police  officers,  seconded  from  the  local  state  or 
territory police force. The intention was that PSOs would undertake CTFR and 
that  AUP  officers  would  attend  to  other  policing  responsibilities.  As  at 
May 2009, there was a total of 780 police officers at the designated airports, of 
which 225 were AUP and 445 were PSOs. 
The Beale Review 
1.13 In the lead‐up to the 2007 federal election, the then Opposition made a 
commitment that if it were successful in gaining government, it would conduct 
a  federal  audit  of  police  capabilities.  This  commitment  recognised  that  the 
AFP’s  budget  had  grown  from  $302 million  in  2000−01  to  $1.141  billion  in 
2008−09  and  that  it  had  been  ‘required  in  recent  years  to  meet  increasing 
demands  encompassing  complex  whole  of  government,  national  and 
international  issues’.  In January 2009,  the  then  Minister  for  Home  Affairs 
announced that this review would be conducted by Roger Beale AO. 
1.14 The Beale  review was  released  in June 2009.  It  found  that  ‘the hybrid 
model  is  flawed’.37  In  particular,  some  state  police  jurisdictions  had  been 
‘unable or unwilling’ to provide the full complement of personnel as agreed by 
the states  in  the COAG context. Further,  ‘there are ongoing  tensions between 
police  drawn  from  an  AFP  background  and  those  seconded  from  the 
                                                     
36  The role of PSOs is to keep individuals and interests identified by the Commonwealth as being at risk 
safe from acts of terrorism, violent protest and issues motivated violence. Their powers are more 
limited than those of sworn AFP officers. 
37  New Realities: National Policing in the 21st Century: Federal Audit of Police Capabilities, 
Roger Beale AO, June 2009, pp.11, 29, 160. 
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States/Territories,  which  threaten  the  overall  effectiveness  of  the  Unified 
Policing  Model  in  a  number  of  jurisdictions’.  The  review  also  found  that 






model,  with  the  AFP  providing  all  policing,  including  both  CTFR  and 
community policing.38 On balance, the review recommended adopting the ‘All 
In’  model.  The  Australian  Government  accepted  this  recommendation  in 









 maintaining  a  community  policing  presence  and  providing  high 
visibility patrols; 




1.17 As  at  30  June  2013,  the  approved  staffing  level  for  police  at  the 
10 designated  airports  (not  including headquarters) was  689.  In  2012−13,  the 
                                                     
38  Under the ‘All In’ model, all police at airports would be sworn police officers employed by the AFP. 
State police could be called in to assist as necessary (such as a major emergency). 
39  In this report, ‘Aviation function’ refers to the business area within AFP that discharges the policing 
function at Australia’s 10 designated airports. 
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budgeted  expenses  for  the  AFP’s  Aviation  function  was  $74.1  million.  
Figure 1.1 shows the current location of the 10 designated airports with an AFP 
presence. 
1.18 Notwithstanding  that  under  the  ʹAll  Inʹ  model,  the  AFP  has  taken 




current  model,  this  responsibility  is  acknowledged  in  Memoranda  of 
Understanding  (MOUs)  between  the AFP  and  the  state  and  territory  police 
forces, with the AFP providing CTFR until the relevant police force  is able to 
take  control  of  the  response. The MOUs  also provide  for  state  and  territory 
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Figure 1.1:  Location of AFP at Australia’s 10 designated airports 
 
Source: AFP. 
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Overseas airport policing models 
1.19 The  ANAO  reviewed  the  models  for  policing  at  airports  in  several 
overseas countries. This review identified the different approaches taken, with 





Audit objective, criteria and methodology 







 appropriate processes  are  in place  for managing  risk  and operational 
planning; 






1.22 Audit  fieldwork was undertaken primarily at  the AFP’s headquarters 
in Canberra.  The  audit  team  also  visited  Sydney,  Brisbane, Gold Coast  and 
Darwin airports and held discussions at each location with AFP officers, state 
police  officers  and  airport  operators.  Discussions  were  also  held  with  the 
DIRD’s Office of Transport Security with respect to aviation security. 
1.23 The  audit  was  conducted  in  accordance  with  ANAO  auditing 
standards at a cost of approximately $511 000. 
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2. Transition to a New Workforce Model 
This chapter examines the AFP’s management of the projects to transition policing at 
Australia’s  designated  airports  to  a  workforce  of  fully  sworn  AFP  officers.  It  also 
discusses  the  benefits  of  the move  to  the  ʹAll  Inʹ model  as  well  as  the  legislative 
framework supporting this model.  
Introduction 
2.1 Project  Macer  was  established  to  plan,  manage  and  implement  the 
transition to the new ‘All In’ model. Project Guild was a sub‐project of Project 








2.2 The  successful  management  of  projects  is  generally  based  on  a 
structured  project  management  methodology.  There  are  a  number  of  such 
methodologies  available,  of  which  one  is  PRINCE2.41  The  AFP’s  Portfolio 
Management  Office  (PMO)42  has  adopted  PRINCE2  as  the  mandatory 
methodology  for  managing  Tier  1  (‘mega‐projects’)  and  Tier  2  (‘significant 
projects’). Project Macer was a Tier 1 project. 
2.3 The stated objective of Project Macer was  to  facilitate  the replacement 
of  the  existing UPM  at  the  10 designated Australian  airports  to  the  ‘All  In’ 
model through transitioning: 
                                                     
40  Canine facilities already existed for Canberra airport since the national canine training facility is 
located near Canberra airport. 
41  PRINCE2 is an acronym for Projects in Controlled Environments (Version 2). It was originally 
developed by the United Kingdom Office of Government Commerce. 
42  The PMO’s stated role is ‘to manage the investment process, strategic alignment, prioritisation and 
selection, progress monitoring, optimisation and benefits achieved by an organization’s projects and 
programs on behalf of its senior management’. Source: AFP Better Practice Advice: Governance and 
Management Arrangements for Tier 1, 2 and 3 Projects and Programs.  
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year  period  from August  2009.  The  costs  associated with  delivering  Project 
Macer were to be drawn from the AFP’s existing budget allocations, with the 
budget for the Project being $32.7 million. 
2.5 Consistent with  PRINCE2 methodology,  Project Macer  had  a  Senior 
Responsible  Officer  (Deputy  Commissioner,  National  Security),  a  Project 
Executive  (National Manager, Aviation), a Project Sponsor, a Project Director 
and a Project Manager, with a Project Team of seven people. In addition, there 
was  a  Project  Board  comprising  AFP  senior  executive  officers43  and  a 
representative  of  the Attorney‐General’s Department  and  a  Project Working 
Group. 
2.6 The  ANAO  compared  the  Project  Macer  documentation  with  the 
framework suggested  in the PRINCE2 methodology guide44 and found that  it 
included all the key documents required. Table 2.1 lists these documents. 
Table 2.1: Project Macer documentation 
Document Summary of contents 
Project Brief Project definition (objectives, scope, inclusions, exclusions, 
deliverables); 
Outline Business Plan; and 
High level summary of risks. 
Initiation Stage Plan Specifies products to be delivered in Initiation Stage. 
Project Initiation Document Project definition; 
Context for project ; 
Project success criteria; 
Project organisation; 
Business case; 
Risk management plan (including risk register); and 
Communication plan. 
                                                     
43  National Managers Aviation, Protection, Human Resources, Policy and Governance, Close Operations 
Support, Managers Aviation Infrastructure, Aviation Operations Support, Legal and a Financial 
Controller. The Board met on 23 occasions between September 2009 and April 2013. 
44  Managing Successful Projects with PRINCE2, Office of Government Commerce, 2009. 
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Business case; 
Risk management plan (including risk register); and 
Communication plan. 
                                                     
43  National Managers Aviation, Protection, Human Resources, Policy and Governance, Close Operations 
Support, Managers Aviation Infrastructure, Aviation Operations Support, Legal and a Financial 
Controller. The Board met on 23 occasions between September 2009 and April 2013. 
44  Managing Successful Projects with PRINCE2, Office of Government Commerce, 2009. 
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Document Summary of contents 
Strategic Project Plan Project objectives, benefits, outputs and outcomes; and 
Outlines of the stages of the project. 
Project Stage Plans Detailed plans for each of the three stages of the project. 
Project End Stage Plans 
(three stages) 
Report at the end of each stage, including: 
Performance against stage plan; 
 Events impacting stage; 
 Lessons learned; 
 Current status; and 
 Outlook. 
Close down plan Outline of activity required to close the project, including: 
 Ensure project objectives have been met; 
 Evaluate project; 
 Identify and allocate responsibility for any residual tasks 
required after transition to ‘business as usual’. 
End Project Plan Assessment against the Project Brief and Project Initiation 
Document; 
Assessment of realisation of benefits and efficiencies; and 
Lessons learned. 




and 445 PSOs.  In relation  to AUP officers,  the AFP decided  to offer  them  the 
opportunity  to  join  the AFP, provided  they met  the necessary  requirements. 
Those AUP officers who did not wish  to  take up  this offer were  returned  to 
their  ‘home’ police  force. The AFP negotiated with  state  and  territory police 
forces to ‘stage’ their return so that there were adequate police numbers at the 
designated airports during  the  transition process  to continue  the provision of 
effective policing services.  
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 transfer  to  a  position  at  another  location  with  available  PSO45  or 
unsworn positions; or 
 leave the AFP (either through voluntary redundancy or resignation). 
2.9 At  the end of  stage  three of Project Macer  in  July 2013,  the  transition 
process was completed (with the exception of eight officers who were on long‐
term leave due to illness or injury). In summary, 274 PSOs and 71 AUP officers 
successfully  transitioned  to  sworn  AFP  positions.  One  hundred  and 
fifteen PSOs were  redeployed  to elsewhere  in  the AFP and 100 PSOs  retired, 
resigned or accepted voluntary redundancy.  
2.10 Figure  2.1  demonstrates  the  transition  process  over  the  period 
January 2009  to November  2013.  It  shows  that,  as  the  number  of  PSOs  and 
AUP  officers  gradually  decreased,  the  number  of  sworn  AFP  officers 
increased. The category ‘AFP unsworn’ represents administrative and support 
staff  which  were  not  intended  to  be  transitioned.  This  number  generally 
remained constant over time. 
                                                     
45  The Protection component of the AFP comprises some 700 staff at 15 ‘stations’ around Australia. 
Functions include guarding at key Commonwealth properties including Government House 
(Canberra), Kirribilli and Admiralty Houses (Sydney) and a number of sensitive Defence Force 
establishments in South Australia, Western Australia and the Northern Territory. There are also 
Diplomatic Protection Units in Canberra, Sydney, Melbourne and Perth. 
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Figure 2.1: Categories of police at designated airports, January 2009 to 
November 2013 
 
Source: ANAO analysis of AFP data. 
Agreements with state and territory police forces 
2.11 The  legislative  framework  operating  at  airports  is  complex  and  is 
discussed  in more detail  later  in  this chapter. Both Commonwealth and state 
and  territory  legislation have application and AFP officers need  to be able  to 
use and apply the full range of relevant Commonwealth and state and territory 
legislation  and  powers. While  the  Commonwealth  Places  (Application  of  Laws) 
Act 1970  allows  AFP  officers  to  exercise  powers  under  state  and  territory 
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the  AFP  to  be  able  to  call  upon  their  state  or  territory  counterparts  if 
necessary.46  Consequently,  as  part  of  Project  Macer,  the  AFP  sought  to 
negotiate  ‘Head  Agreements’  with  each  state  and  territory  (except  the 
Australian Capital Territory)47 outlining each party’s roles and responsibilities.  
2.12 The  AFP  has  secured  in‐principle  agreement  with  most  state  and 
territory police  forces  to swear AFP officers  in as special constables48 so  they 
may  deal  with  offences  against  state  and  territory  legislation.  As  at 
November 2013,  a Head Agreement with New  South Wales  (NSW) had  still 
not  been  reached,  although  AFP  officers  in  NSW  have  been  sworn  in  as 
Recognised Law Enforcement Officers (RLEOs) under NSW legislation. Whilst 




the  AFP  and  all  state  and  territory  police  forces,  the  extended  negotiation 
periods  for  some  Head  Agreements  has  generally  had  no  discernable 
on‐ground effect.  In  the case of Queensland,  the previous absence of a Head 
Agreement  meant  that  local  procedures  training  had  not  been  provided  in 
some years (as outlined in Table 2.4). 
Project Guild 
2.14 ASOs  were  introduced  in  December  2001  following  the 
September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States. Their role is to travel discreetly 
on selected domestic and  international  flights  to provide security against any 
person or group who attempts to take control of an aircraft or to cause death or 




Aviation  function,  the AFP decided  to  transition  the ASO program  to a  fully 
sworn  police  workforce  in  the  same  way  as  Project  Macer.  This  became  a 
                                                     
46  For example, in the event of a major incident beyond the resources of the AFP at an airport to deal 
with or the investigation of complex or serious offences against state or territory legislation. 
47  The AFP provides general and community policing in the ACT under the terms of an agreement with 
the ACT Government. A separate agreement was therefore not necessary. 
48  In NSW, special constables are known as Recognised Law Enforcement Officers (RLEOs). 
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sub‐project  of  Project  Macer  and  was  known  as  Project  Guild.  Costs  for 





transition process was  essentially  the  same  as  for Project Macer. By February 
2013, the transition of the ASO workforce to sworn police officers was complete. 
Program Jupiter 




the  10 designated  airports  and  canine  facilities  at  nine of  these  airports. 
Agreement was  sought and  reached with  the owners of airports and private 
developers to construct purpose‐built facilities which the AFP then leased from 
them.  The AFP  administered  this  as  a  series  of  projects  collectively  named 
Program Jupiter. 49 
2.18 Under  the  terms  of  the  decision  to  approve  the  funds,  the AFP was 
required to obtain the agreement of the Department of Finance50 to each lease 
to ensure  that  its commercial  terms were reasonable and  in  line with current 
market conditions. 
2.19 In  October  2011,  the  AFP  commissioned  an  independent  review  of 
Program  Jupiter.  The  review  made  a  number  of  relatively  minor 
recommendations and concluded: 
Provided  the  recommendations  of  this  report  are  addressed,  the  SRO51  can 
have confidence  that  the  Jupiter Program will deliver  its project outputs and 
program business outcomes  as  required  in  the Business Case  (updated) and 
Cabinet approved NPP. 
                                                     
49  In the AFP, a number of linked projects is termed a program. 
50  The Property and Construction division of the Department of Finance oversees the Commonwealth 
Property Management Framework which includes legislation and policy for property leased or owned 
by the Commonwealth. (Source: http://www.finance.gov.au/property/property/index.html). 
51  Under PRINCE2 project methodology (see paragraph 1.2), each project has a Senior Responsible 
Officer. For Program Jupiter, this was the Deputy Commissioner National Security. 
  
ANAO Audit Report No.23 2013–14 
Policing at Australian International Airports 
 
46 
2.20 At  the  time of  this  audit,  10 of  the  19 projects had been  completed52, 
with  the  overall  program  anticipated  to  be  completed  during  2015.  The 
approved  budget  for  the  10  completed  projects was  $72.5 million  and  their 
final cost was $51.4 million (71 per cent).53 
Transitional training 




noted,  for  AFP  officers  policing  at  airports,  training  in  both  the 
Commonwealth and state and territory legislation is also important. 
2.22 Prior to being accepted for training, potential AFP recruits are required 
to pass  through a number of  ‘gateways’,  including a security clearance, drug 
testing, meet minimum fitness and medical standards, and complete aptitude 
and  psychological  tests.  The  basic  training  for  new  recruits  comprises  a 
26 week residential course at the AFP College54 in Canberra. Potential recruits 
who  have  prior  experience  in  other  police  forces  have  their  training  needs 
individually  assessed  and  are  not  generally  required  to  undergo  the  full 
26 week  course. All potential AFP  recruits  undergo  the  same  basic  training, 
and to a lesser extent receive training in specialist areas such as Aviation.  
2.23 After successfully completing training, graduates are sworn  in as AFP 
officers  and  are  deployed.  On the  job  training  continues  throughout  a 
12 month  probation  period,  during  which  new  officers  are  required  to 
maintain a workbook that requires supervisor certification that they have met 
competency  levels.  After  successfully  completing  probation55,  officers  are 
awarded  a  Diploma  of  Public  Safety  (Policing),  a  nationally  recognised 
qualification.  
                                                     
52  The completed projects were the main facilities at Adelaide, Brisbane, Canberra, Darwin, Melbourne 
and Sydney and canine facilities at Adelaide, Cairns, Darwin and the Gold Coast. 
53  The AFP advised that leasing costs were less than had been estimated in 2007–08. 
54  The AFP College is a Registered Training Organisation with the Australian Skills Quality Authority. 
55  This includes the completion of a workbook. 
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Operational safety training 
2.24  AFP  officers  are  required  to  maintain  mandatory  qualifications  in 
operational  safety  (previously  known  as use  of  force).  Initial  qualification  is 
obtained during recruit training and officers are then required to be requalified 
annually. The Commissioner’s Order  on Operational  Safety  states  that  if  an 
officer’s qualification expires, the officer must return munitions and equipment 
and stand down from operational duty.  
2.25 Operational  safety  qualifications  are  monitored  monthly  by  the 
Aviation executive through the Performance on a Page (PoP) report. The PoP 




Abbreviated Macer and Guild training 
2.26 PSOs  working  at  airports  had  previously  undergone  training  in 
Protection  when  they  first  joined  the  AFP  and  many  AUP  officers  were 
experienced state or territory police officers. Both groups had varying levels of 
experience working in the airport environment. In recognition of this previous 
learning  and  experience,  the  AFP  developed  three  abbreviated  training 
courses, which are outlined in Table 2.2. However, both PSOs and AUP officers 
who  wished  to  transition  were  required  to  successfully  complete  the 
six ‘gateways’ before being admitted to the appropriate course.56 
                                                     
56  The ‘gateways’ included testing physical fitness, prior knowledge and competency in contemporary 
policing.  
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Table 2.2: Project Macer training requirements 
Course Audience  Duration of course 
Federal Police Conversion 
Program 
Current AUP officers or those 
who left the police less than 12 
months previously. 
Three weeks 
Federal Police Lateral 
Program 
Former AFP or AUP officers 
who left more than 12 months 
(but less than 24 months) 
previously. 
Six weeks 
Federal Police Transition 
Program 
Serving PSOs or AUP officers 




2.27 Between  October  2010  and  May  2013,  when  the  last  course  was 
conducted,  the AFP  ran a  total of 16 courses  for a  total of 383 PSOs or AUP 
officers wishing to transition. All AFP officers at airports have now completed 
the training required under Project Macer. 









Savings from the introduction of the 'All In' model  
2.29 One of  the  reasons  for  the Beale  review preferring  the  ʹAll  Inʹ model 
was the potential for cost savings. These savings arose in two ways: firstly, the 
AFP would not have to pay a number of administration fees previously levied 
by  state  and  territory police  forces under  the UPM57;  and  secondly,  a  single 
                                                     
57  For example, state and territory police forces charged the AFP an annual administration fee of up to 
$10 000 per seconded officer. In 2010, these fees totalled $1.7 million. 
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fully  sworn  police  force  at  airports  would  have  cost  efficiencies  since  all 
policing  responsibilities would be  carried  out by  a  single work  force,  rather 
than CTFR and community policing being carried out by two workforces.  
2.30 The actual staffing and cost data from the AFP for the period 2009−10 to 
2012−13  is outlined  in Figure 2.2. Although  staffing numbers decreased over 
the  entire period,  staffing  costs  increased  from 2009−10  to 2010−11. The AFP 
advised  that  the  reason  for  this  increase  was  delays  in  determining  and 
finalising administration fees (attributed under the previous UPM) to the state 
and territory police forces. Figure 2.2 also shows that the total cost of AFP staff 
at  the  10 designated  airports  has  reduced  from  $84 million  in  2009−10  to 
$74.1 million  in  2012−13,  a  reduction  of  almost  12 per cent.  Despite  this 
reduction  in  the  total cost of policing at  the 10 designated airports,  the actual 
cost per officer (shown in Figure 2.3) has increased. The AFP advised that this 
is  largely  due  to  increases  in  salaries  resulting  from  the AFP’s  three‐yearly 
Enterprise Agreements.  
Figure 2.2: Aviation staffing and cost 2009−10 to 2012−13 
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Figure 2.3: Monthly cost per officer 2009−10 to 2012−13 
 
Source: ANAO analysis of AFP data. 
2.31 As discussed,  the original projected  timeframe  for Project Macer was 
three to five years, at an estimated cost of $32.7 million. The End Project Report 
states  that  the  project  took  three  years  and  10 months, with  a  total  cost  of 





Legislative framework supporting the 'All In' model  
2.32 As noted at paragraph 2.11, AFP officers at designated airports can use 
and apply both Commonwealth and state and territory legislation and powers. 
The  key  difference  between  the  Commonwealth  and  state  and  territory 
legislative regimes  is  that  there are no  ‘community policing’ powers  (such as 
the power to move people on) in Commonwealth legislation. This stems from 
the  fact  that when  the AFP was  established  in  1979,  as  a  national  policing 
                                                     
58  The original estimate of $32.7 million contained four stages. The estimated cost of Stage Four, which 
was primarily training for new recruits, was $13.8 million and was to be completed in 2013–14 and 
2014–15. In the event, Project Macer was completed by the end of 2012–13 and the originally 
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The  key  difference  between  the  Commonwealth  and  state  and  territory 
legislative regimes  is  that  there are no  ‘community policing’ powers  (such as 
the power to move people on) in Commonwealth legislation. This stems from 
the  fact  that when  the AFP was  established  in  1979,  as  a  national  policing 
                                                     
58  The original estimate of $32.7 million contained four stages. The estimated cost of Stage Four, which 
was primarily training for new recruits, was $13.8 million and was to be completed in 2013–14 and 
2014–15. In the event, Project Macer was completed by the end of 2012–13 and the originally 
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able  to carry out  the  full range of policing powers at designated airports,  the 
AFP needs to be able to draw upon powers in both Commonwealth and state 
and territory legislation. The AFP recognises the complexity of this framework. 
In  February  2010,  prior  to  the  transition  to  the  ʹAll  Inʹ model,  a  document 
prepared for the Project Macer Board stated: 
The  legislative  framework underpinning  the  current Unified Policing Model 
(UPM)  at  the  designated  airports  involves  a  complex  interaction  of 
State/Territory  and  Commonwealth  law,  varies  from  jurisdiction  to 
jurisdiction and  in  some cases  from airport  to airport  in  the  same State. The 
existing framework creates a number of issues for the AFP. A move to an ‘all‐
in’ model  in which  the AFP  takes  responsibility  for airport uniform policing 
will only exacerbate the issues if a clearer framework is not developed. 
State and territory legislation 
2.33 As  noted  in  paragraph  1.9,  the  land  on which  all  of  the  designated 
airports  is  situated  (except  Cairns)  was  acquired  by  the  Australian 
Government  in  the  1920s.  Section  52(i) of  the Constitution provides  that  the 
Australian  Parliament  ‘shall  have  exclusive  power…to  make  laws…with 
respect to all places acquired by the Commonwealth for public purposes’. Prior 
to  1970,  it  had  been  assumed  that  both  state  and  territory  legislation  and 
Commonwealth  legislation  could  co‐exist  at  ‘Commonwealth  places’. 
However, two High Court decisions in 197060 held that the effect of s. 52(i) was 
to  terminate  the  application  of  state  and  territory  laws  from  the  date  of 
acquisition of the land. The effect of this decision was significant because at the 





59  As previously noted, the AFP provides community policing in the ACT under the terms of a contract 
with the ACT Government. However, its community policing powers are drawn from ACT legislation, 
not Commonwealth legislation. The AFP’s provision of policing services to the ACT was examined by 
the ANAO in 2012–13, in The Provision of Policing Services to the Australian Capital Territory, Audit 
Report No.13 2012–13. 
60  Worthing v Rowell, (1970) 123 CLR 89 and R v Phillips (1970) 125 CLR 93. 
61  Commonwealth, Official Hansard p. 2801, House of Representatives, 27 October 1970, T Hughes, 
Attorney-General. 
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the  High  Court  decisions,  the  Australian  Government  passed  the 
Commonwealth Places (Application of Laws) Act 1970 (the COPAL Act).  
2.34 The COPAL Act was to apply as Commonwealth law the provisions of 
state  (but not  territory)  legislation. This  is known as applied state  legislation. 
This  means  that  AFP  officers  at  Adelaide,  Brisbane,  Gold  Coast,  Hobart, 
Melbourne,  Perth  and  Sydney  airports  are  able  to  exercise  powers  and 
investigate  offences  under  the  relevant  law  of  the  state.62  However,  advice 
received by  the AFP from the Australian Government Solicitor (AGS)  in 1989 
and  reaffirmed  in  2012  is  that AFP officers  are only  able  to  exercise powers 
contained wholly within  state  legislation and which do not  require going  to 
another person  for permission or  authorisation.63 This  is known  as  the  ‘bare 
powers’ restraint.64 
2.35 The Commonwealth Crimes Act  1914  (the Crimes Act)  provides AFP 
officers  with  a  wide  range  of  investigative  powers  (such  as  the  power  to 
require  identity  information  at  airports). However,  the COPAL Act  did  not 
permit  the AFP  to  use  these  powers where  they were  investigating  applied 
state  offences. This was  because under  the previous UPM, with  state police 
officers seconded  to AUP,  they had access  to  their own suite of  investigative 
powers.  Concurrent  with  the  transition  to  a  fully  sworn  AFP  model,  the 
COPAL Act was amended to explicitly allow the use of the Crimes Act powers 




to  the  arrest,  questioning,  charging  and  bailing  of  offenders  vary  between 
jurisdictions. 
                                                     
62  In Darwin and Canberra, the power to use Northern Territory and ACT laws is conferred by specific 
provisions contained in the Australian Federal Police Act 1979. The COPAL Act does not apply at 
Cairns airport because it is not a Commonwealth place.  
63  For example, the NSW Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 allows for a ‘police 
officer’ to apply to a magistrate for a search warrant in certain circumstances. The same Act defines 
‘police officer’ to be a member of the NSW police. An AFP officer would therefore not be able to apply 
for such a warrant. However, an AFP officer can seek a warrant under the Commonwealth Crimes 
Act 1914. 
64  While the validity of the COPAL Act has been upheld by a number of court decisions (including the 
High Court in Pinkstone v R, 219 CLR 444), the concept of the ‘bare powers’ has not been subject to 
judicial consideration. 
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2.36 The AFP expects  its officers  to have as a minimum at  least a working 
knowledge of the state and territory legislation relevant to policing at airports. 
There are currently 300 pieces of  relevant  legislation covering each state and 




is  simpler  because  Commonwealth  criminal  legislation  was  drafted  to 




at airports,  including provisions relating  to offences  that might be committed 
at  airports  and  officers’  powers.65  Table  2.3  summarises  the  legislation 
contained  in  the  Guide  and  the  number  of  provisions  in  each  piece  of 
legislation which relate to policing at airports. 
Table 2.3: Aviation Condensed Criminal Law Guide 2011 
Legislation Number of 
provisions 
listed in Guide 
Air Navigation Act 1920 8 
Air Navigation Regulations 1947 3 
Airports (Control of On-Airport Activity) Regulations 1997 54 
Australian Federal Police Act 1979 20 
Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 24 
Aviation Transport Security Regulations 2005 45 
Civil Aviation Act 1988 17 
Civil Aviation Regulations 1988 14 
Commonwealth Places (Application of Laws) Act 1970 18 
                                                     
65  In Australia, legislation takes two principal forms: Acts and Regulations. Acts must be passed by both 
Houses of Parliament and do not take effect until given Royal Assent by the Governor-General. 
Regulations may be made by the Governor-General (but must be authorised by an Act) but can be 
disallowed by Parliament. Generally, Regulations relate to simpler or less contentious matters than 
Acts. Since the Guide contains reference to both Acts and Regulations, the generic word ‘legislation’ 
has been used. 
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Legislation Number of 
provisions 
listed in Guide 
Crimes Act 1914 52 
Crimes (Aviation) Act 1991 38 
Criminal Code Act 1995 111 
Public Order (Protection of Property and Persons) Act 1971 15 
Total 419 
Source: ANAO analysis of AFP data. 
2.38 As noted above, Cairns airport is a particular challenge because it is not 
a  Commonwealth  place  and  the  COPAL Act  therefore  does  not  operate  to 
allow  the  AFP  to  use  Queensland  legislation  as  applied  Commonwealth 
legislation. Further, as noted at paragraph 2.12, AFP officers in Queensland are 
not presently  sworn  in as special constables. This means  that AFP officers at 
Cairns airport do not have  the ability  to use Queensland  legislation and will 
not  be  able  to  do  so  until  they  are  sworn  in  as  special  constables  (see 
paragraph 2.12).  However,  AFP  officers  have  ‘common  law’  powers  which 
allow  them  to  detain  suspects  and  hand  them  over  to  Queensland  police 
officers upon arrival. 
Risk mitigation strategies 
2.39 The AFP  identified  the  legislative  framework as an area of risk  in  the 
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 allow  its officers  to use  investigative powers conferred upon  them by 
part IAA of the Crimes Act to investigate offences under applied state 
legislation; and 
 provide  a  statutory  basis  for  its  officers  to  be  sworn  in  as  state  or 
territory special constables.66 
Seeking legal advice 
2.42 On numerous occasions,  the AFP has sought advice  from  the AGS on 
the  extent  of  its  powers  under  the  legislative  framework.  For  example,  in 
March 2012,  the AGS provided a  summation of previous advices about AFP 
police powers at airports and, in the same month, it provided a separate advice 
about  how  the  AFP  chooses  whether  to  use  Commonwealth  or  state  and 
territory  powers  in  given  situations.  In  addition,  the  AFP’s  internal  legal 
section has provided advice arising from specific incidents.  
Effective liaison with state and territory police 
2.43 As  noted  above,  the AFP may  need  to  call  upon  state  and  territory 
police  in  the  event  of  a  serious  incident  or  a  serious  crime  under  state  and 
territory  legislation.  To  this  end,  it  is  important  that  the  AFP  has  good 
relationships  with  its  state  and  territory  counterparts.  The  ANAO 
communicated  with  all  state  and  territory  police  forces  and  interviewed 
representatives  of  the  police  forces  of NSW, Queensland  and  the Northern 
Territory. All state and  territory police  forces confirmed  that  they enjoy very 




2.44 For new  recruits  to  the AFP  (and  for officers who  transitioned under 
Project Macer),  training  in relevant Commonwealth  legislation  is provided at 
the AFP College  in Canberra  (see paragraph 2.26). The ANAO  reviewed  the 
training material  and  established  that  it  included  all  relevant  legislation  as 
shown in Table 2.3.  
                                                     
66  These amendments were passed by Parliament in the Aviation Crimes and Policing Legislation Act 
2011 and came into effect on 2 March 2011. 
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State and territory legislation 
2.45 Training  in state and  territory  legislation  (known as Local Procedures 
Training)  is provided by  the  relevant police  force with  costs  recovered  from 
the AFP. The ANAO sought the AFP’s advice as to the duration of the courses 
provided by state and territory police forces. This is shown in Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4: Duration of training in state and territory legislation 
provided by state and territory police forces 
State Duration  Comment 
NSW 8 days RLEO training focusing on NSW legislation and procedures. AFP 
officers at Sydney airport must complete the training before being 
sworn in as RLEOs. 
VIC 10 days AFP officers at Melbourne airport must complete local 
procedures training with VICPOL before being sworn in as 
special constables. 
QLD Nil Due to absence of a Head Agreement until late July 2013, 
Queensland Police have not provided training for some years. 
However, some experienced Queensland Police officers 
transitioned to the AFP under Project Macer and they have 
provided a limited amount of informal training. Negotiations are 
underway with Queensland Police to develop a course with a 
duration of 80 hours. 
SA 3 days AFP officers at Adelaide airport must complete local procedures 
training with SAPOL before being sworn in as special constables. 
WA 10 days WA Police require AFP officers to use WAPOL’s Incident 
Management System when using state legislation. 
TAS 3.5 days AFP officers at Hobart airport take part in the Joint Policing 
Patrols Initiative. 
NT 10 days NT Police have not provided a course since 2010 due to other 
priorities. 
ACT - Training in ACT law is undertaken by recruits during training at 
the AFP College. 
Source:  AFP. 
2.46 While it has been agreed between the AFP and state and territory police 
forces  that  the  latter  will  provide  training,  Table  2.4  shows  that  in  some 




are  experienced  former  state  and  territory  police  officers who  are  now AFP 
officers who can provide guidance and support to new officers. However, it is 
of  concern  that  the AFP  estimates  that  25  per  cent  of  officers  at Melbourne 
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are  experienced  former  state  and  territory  police  officers who  are  now AFP 
officers who can provide guidance and support to new officers. However, it is 
of  concern  that  the AFP  estimates  that  25  per  cent  of  officers  at Melbourne 
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Darwin  airport  have  received  no  formal  training  in  the  relevant  state  and 
territory legislation. 
Reference materials 
2.47 As  noted  at  paragraph  2.37,  the  AFP  has  produced  a  Condensed 
Criminal  Law Guide  (the Guide) which  is  provided  to  officers  during  their 




legislation  is  often updated  and  amended; while  some  amendments may be 
minor  and have negligible practical  effect,  other  amendments may be major 
and reflect the introduction of new government policy. The ANAO examined 
all amendments made to the 13 pieces of legislation since July 2011 (and which 
are  consequently  not  reflected  in  the  Guide).  In  total,  there  were  54  such 
amendments and, of these, 21 affected provisions listed in the Guide.  
2.48 As noted at paragraph 2.36,  the AFP has also  included on  the Hub a 
listing  of  state  and  territory  legislation  relevant  to  airports.  Since  this 
compilation is hyperlinked to each state government’s legislation database, it is 
reasonable to assume that it is up to date. 
2.49 The  ANAO  recognises  that  it  is  difficult  to  keep  multiple  copies  of 
paper‐based  documents  (such  as  the  Guide)  fully  up  to  date.  It  is  also 
unrealistic to expect AFP officers on patrol to carry around a lengthy (in excess 
of  300  pages)  document  such  as  the  Guide.  The  AFP  advised  that  it  is 
examining whether AFP officers  in  the  field can be provided with hand‐held 
electronic devices  to access  the Hub, allowing  them  real‐time access  to up  to 
date Commonwealth and state and territory legislation. 
Alternatives to present framework 
2.50 As noted in paragraph 1.15, the 2009 Beale review67 found that the then 
current  policing model,  known  as  the  hybrid model, where AFP  PSOs  had 
responsibility  for  CTFR  and  state  and  territory  police68  attended  to  other 
policing responsibilities, was  ‘flawed’. He reported that there was a ‘common 
                                                     
67  New Realities: National Policing in the 21st Century, Roger Beale AO, June 2009. 
68  State and territory police were seconded to the AFP. 
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view  among  State/Territory  and  Commonwealth  police  chiefs  that  an 
integrated policing operation  at  each  airport provided by one  jurisdiction  at 
each  airport  was  preferable  to  the  current  hybrid  model  with  separate 
protection and policing streams’. He considered that there were thus only two 
alternatives:  the  ‘All  Out’  model,  with  state  and  territory  police  forces 
responsible  for  all policing  at  airports, or  the  ʹAll  Inʹ model, where  the AFP 
performs the function. The report concluded that: 
On balance, and with an element of reluctance, the Audit has reached the view 
that  the  ʹAll  Inʹ  model  under  which  the  Commonwealth  accepts  clear 
responsibility to fund and staff airport policing and security is more  likely to 
be sustainable in the long run. 
2.51 The recommendation  that  the  ʹAll  Inʹ model be adopted was accepted 
by  the  then  Government.  Even  if  the  review  had  recommended  (and  the 
Government accepted) adoption of  the  ‘All Out’ model,  this would not have 
resolved  the  complexity  of  the  legislative  framework:  rather,  it would  have 
reversed  the  position,  with  state  and  territory  police  having  to  apply 
Commonwealth legislation. Accordingly, it is reasonable to consider whether it 
would  be  possible  and/or  desirable  to  replace  the  current  legislative 
framework  with  one  in  which  there  was  only  one  set  of  laws  applying  at 
airports. 
2.52 At  the second meeting of  the Project Macer Board  in February 2010, a 
paper on legislative options was presented. The paper noted the complexity of 
the current regime, where the AFP needed to rely on applied state  legislation 






 expanding  the  application  of  existing  powers:  for  example,  those 




2.53 The  Project Macer  Board  considered  that  the most  urgent  legislative 
reforms required were the relatively minor amendments necessary to allow the 
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Commonwealth legislation. Accordingly, it is reasonable to consider whether it 
would  be  possible  and/or  desirable  to  replace  the  current  legislative 
framework  with  one  in  which  there  was  only  one  set  of  laws  applying  at 
airports. 
2.52 At  the second meeting of  the Project Macer Board  in February 2010, a 
paper on legislative options was presented. The paper noted the complexity of 
the current regime, where the AFP needed to rely on applied state  legislation 






 expanding  the  application  of  existing  powers:  for  example,  those 




2.53 The  Project Macer  Board  considered  that  the most  urgent  legislative 
reforms required were the relatively minor amendments necessary to allow the 
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AFP  to  use  the  full  range  of  its  investigative  powers  and  to  provide  a 
legislative basis  for  the  swearing of AFP officers  as  state or  territory  special 
constables  (see  paragraph  2.41). Consequently,  the  options  for  developing  a 
Commonwealth  legislative  framework  were  not  considered  further  at  that 
time. 
2.54 In April 2012,  the AFP’s  internal  legal section prepared another paper 
on  the  legislative  options.  It  identified  three  options  for  the  Project  Macer 
Board to consider: 










in  turn  reduce  the  scope  for  defendants  to  avoid  prosecution  by 





 increased  workforce  flexibility  since  officers  could  be  moved  from 
airport  to  airport  to  meet  workforce  needs  and  would  not  require 
retraining on each occasion. 
2.56 However,  the paper also  identified a number of potential difficulties. 
First,  adoption  of  either  Options Two  or  Three  could  be  perceived  as 
unnecessary since  the existing arrangements provided a  framework covering 
all  aspects  of  policing  (albeit with  inherent  risks  as  already  outlined  in  this 
chapter).  Secondly,  state  and  territory  community  policing  legislation  has 
developed  over  many  years  and  is  comprehensive.  Any  newly  developed 
Commonwealth framework would be unlikely to be as comprehensive and the 
AFP might  still  need  to  rely  on  state  or  territory  legislation  to  address  any 
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‘gaps’.  Thirdly,  a  Commonwealth  airport  policing  framework  would  not 
address the issue of Cairns airport, since it is not a Commonwealth place.  
2.57 In  addition,  prosecutions  of  offences  committed  under  applied  state 
legislation at designated airports are generally conducted by state and territory 
Directors of Public Prosecution who may be unwilling  to prosecute offences 
against  Commonwealth  legislation,  creating  a  resource  issue  for  the 
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions.  
2.58 On balance, the Project Macer Board decided to adopt Option One and 
review  the situation  in  two years  time  (that  is,  in about April 2014). While  it 
should  be  acknowledged  that  to  date,  none  of  the  possible  consequences 
identified by the AFP (see paragraph 2.39) have eventuated, the risks of these 
occurring with  the present  framework  continue. However,  the difficulties of 
adopting  the  alternative  options,  such  as  a Commonwealth  airport  policing 
regime, are not insubstantial. Any decision to pursue an alternative legislative 




review  that  an  ʹAll  Inʹ  model  be  adopted  for  policing  at  airports,  it  was 
estimated  that  this  process  would  take  between  three  to  five  years.  In  the 
event, the transition took a little under four years to complete at a reported cost 
significantly less ($16.1 million) than the $32.7 million that was estimated. Both 
Project  Macer  and  Project  Guild  were  effectively  designed,  managed  and 
delivered,  with  their  objectives  of  cost  savings  and  transitioning  the  AFP 
workforce  at  airports  to  fully  sworn  officers  being  achieved.  With  the 
exception  of  Queensland,  agreements  have  been  reached  with  states  and 




2.60 The  legislative  framework which applies at  the 10 designated airports 
is complex,  involving the application of around 300 pieces of Commonwealth 
and  state/territory  legislation.  The  AFP  has  sought  to  mitigate  the  risks 
associated with officers applying a dual regime  through a range of measures 
including  training  and guidance,  legislative  amendments  and  swearing AFP 
officers  in  as  special  constables  of  the  relevant  jurisdiction.  However, 
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review  the  legislative  framework  in  2014  in  the  light  of  experience  and  if 
necessary, make recommendations for reform to government. 
2.61 Notwithstanding any review of  the present  legislative  framework,  the 
AFP will need  to continue  to operate under  the existing  framework  for some 
time to come. The arrangements for state and territory police forces to provide 
formal  training  to  AFP  officers  are  presently  less  than  satisfactory,  with 
significant  numbers  of  officers  having  received  no  formal  training,  even 
though  they  are  using  state  and  territory  legislation  on  a  daily  basis  in 
conducting their duties. Further, there is inconsistency between jurisdictions as 
to the duration of the training being provided. Responsibility for these matters 
rests with  the various  state and  territory police  forces. The ANAO  considers 
there would be benefits  in the AFP approaching the state and territory police 
forces  to  seek  their  agreement  to  jointly  determine  the  appropriate  content, 
duration  and  frequency  of  training  courses,  following  an  assessment  of  the 
training requirements. 
Recommendation No.1  
2.62 To enable AFP officers to maintain appropriate knowledge of state and 
territory  legislative  requirements,  the ANAO  recommends  that  the AFP,  in 
consultation  with  the  relevant  state  and  territory  police  force,  reviews  the 
content, duration and frequency of the legislative training courses. 
Agency response 
2.63 The  AFP  agrees  and  accepts  the  recommendation  and  continues  to  work 
closely  with  State/Territory  law  enforcement  to  develop  the  most  comprehensive 
training  packages  for  each  airport,  ensuring  AFP  members  have  the  required 
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3. Management of AFP Airport 
Operations 























 where  the Australian Customs  and  Border  Protection  Service  detects 
illegal drugs being imported by a passenger, the AFP will respond and 
                                                     
69  Crime Prevention Liaison Officers work with airport stakeholders on crime prevention initiatives. 
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take  the  suspect  and  the  drugs  into  custody  pending  further 
investigation;  
 if a serious crime against state or territory legislation (such as a serious 
assault)  has  been  committed,  the AFP will  take  control  of  the  crime 
scene,  take  any  suspects  into  custody  and  gather  relevant  evidence 
before handing the matter over to the state or territory police force for 
further investigation; and 
 where an arriving passenger has been  refused entry  into Australia by 
officers of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection and is 
required to leave the country, the AFP assists as required. 
3.4 The ANAO examined  the management arrangements put  in place by 







3.5 Overall  control  and  responsibility  for  the  AFP  is  exercised  by  the 
Commissioner,  who  is  supported  by  three  Deputy  Commissioners  and  the 
Chief Operating  Officer.  The National Manager Aviation  (NMA)  is  an  SES 
Band  2  officer  reporting  to  the  Deputy  Commissioner,  National  Security. 
Routine tasking and direction is delegated to the Manager Aviation.  
3.6 The  AFP  uses  a  decentralised  command  structure  for  policing  at 
designated  airports,  whereby  APCs  are  given  significant  autonomy  with 
regard  to  policing  of  airports  and  regions,  guided  by  the  overall  strategic 
direction that is determined by Aviation headquarters. APCs at the four largest 
airports  (Brisbane,  Melbourne,  Perth  and  Sydney)  are  SES  Band  1  officers. 
APCs at  five of  the six smaller airports  (Adelaide, Cairns, Canberra, Darwin, 
and Gold Coast) are AFP Band 9 officers while Hobart has a Band 8 APC. The 
APCs  at  the  smaller  airports  report  to  the NMA  through APCs  at  the  four 
larger airports. The operational command structure is shown in Figure 3.1.  
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Figure 3.1: Aviation function operational command structure 
 
Source: ANAO representation of AFP information. 
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3.8 The  NMA  reports  to  the  AFP  Executive  through  the  Deputy 
Commissioner National Security (DCNS). In addition to scheduled fortnightly 
meetings, the NMA provides the DCNS with oral briefings, written executive 
briefings  and  responses  to  action  items  arising  from  committee meetings  as 
required.  
3.9 The APCs  report  to Aviation  headquarters  through monthly  reports. 
These  reports  cover  various  strategic,  operational  and  security  issues, 
including:  incidents;  canine  and  bomb  appraisal  officer  activity;  time 
attribution; drug  seizures; apprehensions; Regional Rapid Deployment Team 
(RRDT)  activity;  investigations  and  intelligence  team  activity;  and  crime 
analysis.70  The  reports  also  contain  data  from  the  AFP’s  Operations 
Coordination Centre (AOCC), the Internal Audit and Business Analysis team, 
and  individual  airports.  The  airports  provide  other  information  relevant  to 
each individual airport. 
3.10 Monthly  reports are also compiled  relating  to human  resource  issues. 
These  are  known  as  ‘Performance  on  a  Page’  reports  and  they  provide 
information  on  compliance  with  aspects  such  as  operational  safety  (use  of 
force)  qualifications,  performance  development  agreements,  and  time 
recording. Performance on a Page reports include information on the number 
                                                     
70  RRDTs deploy from the 10 designated airports from time to time to larger regional domestic airports. 
The function of RRDTs is to liaise with local state and territory police and the airport owner. Activities 
which may occur during a deployment include high visibility patrols, firearm and explosives detection 
checks on passenger luggage or targeted sweeps of airport areas to search for improvised explosive 
devices. 
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of  staff  at  each  designated  airport,  annual  leave  balances  and  workplace 
incidents. 
Resourcing airport operations 
3.11 The  AFP’s  primary  resource  at  designated  airports  is  its  staff.  The 
current approved staffing  levels  for each of  the 10 airports  is shown  in Table 
3.1. 
Table 3.1: Aviation approved staffing levels, June 2013 
Airport Approved staffing level 30 June 2013 












3.12 As  for  other  Australian  government  agencies,  the  AFP  receives  an 
annual  appropriation  from government  in  the Budget  each year. Within  the 
AFP,  the  Portfolio  Budget Management  Committee  (PBMC)  decides  on  the 
allocations  to  individual  business  areas  and  each  area  is  expected  to  ‘live 
within  its means’. This  requires  forecasting how many Full Time Equivalent 
(FTE) staff the Aviation function can support for the forthcoming year. At the 
beginning of Project Macer  in  July 2010,  the Aviation  function had calculated 
that  it  could  afford  782  FTE  at  the  designated  airports  (across  the  then 
11 airports but not  including head office).  In August 2011,  following PBMC’s 
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within  its means’. This  requires  forecasting how many Full Time Equivalent 
(FTE) staff the Aviation function can support for the forthcoming year. At the 
beginning of Project Macer  in  July 2010,  the Aviation  function had calculated 
that  it  could  afford  782  FTE  at  the  designated  airports  (across  the  then 
11 airports but not  including head office).  In August 2011,  following PBMC’s 
decision on 2011−12 nancial allocations,  this  figure was  revised downwards 
to 704. In December 2011, the then Government decided to withdraw AFP staff 
from  the Alice Springs airport. As a consequence,  the staffing allocation was 
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3.14 Another  consideration  is  responding  to  incidents  within  a  certain 
period of time. When a call for AFP assistance is made, it is routed in the first 
instance  to  the AOCC.73 The AOCC  triages  the  call and assigns  it a priority, 
where Priority 1  is an urgent or serious matter (for which the target response 
time  is  five  to  10  minutes  for  90  per  cent  of  incidents),  and  Priority  4  is 
non‐urgent  (which  has  a  target  response  time  of  24  hours).74  Within  this 
context, an airport’s physical and geospatial layout also has an influence on the 
number  of  officers  required.  For  example,  at  Perth  airport,  there  are  four 
terminals located some kilometres apart. If the Priority 1 response time is to be 
met,  it  is necessary  to have  a  team  (generally  two officers)  at  each  terminal. 
Conversely, at a small airport such as Hobart, with a single terminal, only one 
team is needed to meet the Priority 1 response time. 
3.15 As previously mentioned, during  the audit,  the AFP advised  that  it  is 
developing a resourcing model that takes into account relevant factors such as: 





71  Not including headquarters staff. 
72  The AFP’s 2012−2016 Enterprise Agreement also sets out the terms of employment and working 
conditions of all employees. It governs issues such as how long officers can be required to work and 
minimum rest periods between duty periods. 
73  The AOCC is based in Canberra and provides national and international AFP teams with a 24 hour/ 
seven days a week monitoring, initial response, coordination and communications support service. 
74  Target response times for priority incidents are outlined in Table 4.2. 
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Rostering staff at individual airports 









number  of  aircraft  movements,  the  ANAO  obtained  details  of  the  policing 





75  Curfews at Sydney, Adelaide and Gold Coast airports are between 11.00pm and 6.00am. 
76  Due to the small size of the airport, the AFP have an arrangement with the Tasmania Police who 
perform regular patrols during periods when there are no flights. 
77  It should be remembered that the passenger capacities of aeroplanes varies widely: for example, a 
Bombardier Dash 8 200 Series as operated by Qantas has a seating capacity of 36, while an Airbus 
A380 operated by the same airline seats 484. 
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Figure 3.2: AFP staff on duty compared with flight arrivals and 
departures, Sydney airport, 2 December 2013 
 
Source: Number of flights: Flightstats.com.au; roster details: AFP.  










small  number  of  officers  to  provide  coverage  across  the  three  terminals  at 
Sydney. 
3.19 The ANAO’s  examination of  the  same  information  for  the other nine 
airports  also  showed  a  clear  correlation  between  police  numbers  and  flight 
arrivals and departures. The AFP advised  that  rosters are  set  for a period of 
12 weeks  in  advance  and  that  it  will  ‘fine  tune’  the  number  of  officers  as 
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Guidance supporting policing at airports 
3.20 In  a  highly  operational  environment  such  as  policing,  AFP  officers 
require  training  which  is  underpinned  and  supported  by  appropriate 
organisational  policy  and  guidance  to  carry  out  their duties.  Such  guidance 
ranges  from  orders  with  which  officers  are  required  to  comply,  such  as 
Commissioner’s Orders, to more general guidance materials, such as Practical 
Guides. Collectively,  this  guidance  is  known  in  the AFP  as  the Governance 
Instrument Framework  (GIF). The GIF  is maintained on an electronic system 
accessible  to all AFP staff and  is  located on  the AFP’s  intranet, referred  to as 
the Hub. Components of the GIF are summarised in Table 3.2 below. 
Table 3.2: Components of the GIF 




Made by the Commissioner in accordance 
with s.39 of the Australian Federal Police 
Act 1979Non-compliance may result in 
action by Professional Standards. Applies to 
all AFP appointees.  
CO on Professional 
Standards 
CO on Operational 
Safety (previously known 
as CO on Use of Force) 
National 
Guidelines (NGs) 
Applies to all areas of the AFP (where 
relevant). May contain a compliance 
obligation but are subordinate to COs. 
Managing records 








Applies to specific areas of the AFP (such 
as Aviation) and may contain a compliance 
obligation.  
PG on drug handling and 
storage 
PG on deaths in aviation 




Memoranda of Understanding, Head 
Agreements, etc between the AFP and an 
external organisation.  
Collaborative working 
arrangements between 
state/ territory police and 
AFP 
Airport corporations and 
the AFP for policing at 
airports 
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Instrument Comment  Examples of subject 
matter 
Determinations Issued by the Commissioner to vary or 
extend duties and conditions of AFP 
employment.  







AFP Policies Authorised by the Commissioner as high-
level business planning statements. AFP 
Policies set general parameters and 
directions for other GIF instruments. 
Security policy 






Issued by overseas mission Commanders 
for international deployments.  
Regional Assistance 
Mission to Solomon 
Islands code of conduct 
 
Source: ANAO analysis.  
3.21 The Aviation Governance  Team  and Aviation Operations  decided  in 
March  2013  to  improve  the AFP’s  information management  and governance 
framework. Proposed strategies included: 
 reviewing the information management policy; 
 establishing  its own guidance  for  the use of  information management 




 establishing  a  working  group  to  ensure  currency  and  accuracy  of 
Aviation‐specific information on the Hub. 
                                                     
78  SPOKES is the AFP’s SharePoint Organisational Knowledge Exchange System and is the primary 
system for sharing information across the agency. 
79  PROMIS is the AFP’s Police Real-time Online Management Information System and is the primary 
system for recording and managing operational activity and outcomes.  
80  Non-GIF documents (such as aides memoire) have a governance role, but do not form part of the GIF. 
These documents are intended to provide guidance for officers where the more prescriptive nature of 
GIF instruments may be less appropriate. Non-GIF documents include Administrative Advices, Station 
Protocols, and Aides Memoire. 
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project,  but  that  its  completion  was  dependent  upon  some  changes  to  IT 
systems which were underway. 
Reviewing GIF Instruments 
3.23 GIF  instruments are  to be  reviewed every  two years, or  sooner  if  the 





AFP.81  As  at  May  2013,  254  instruments  (45.8  per  cent)  were  overdue  for 




Aviation GIF Instruments 




55  GIF  instruments  relating  to  the  Aviation  function,  30.9  per  cent 
(17 instruments) were  overdue  for  review.84  There  is  scope  for  the Aviation 
function  to  improve  the  currency  of  its GIF  instruments,  as  required  by  the 
National Guideline on the GIF. 
                                                     
81  The ANAO examined 12 AFP Policies, 100 National Guidelines, 104 Practical Guides, seven 
Commissioner’s Orders, 21 Determinations, 307 external agreements, and two Commander’s Orders. 
82  The four Practical Guides overdue for review include two Practical Guides on Project Macer 
redeployment and lateral recruitment which are now redundant following the completion of Project 
Macer.  
83  The four Head Agreements overdue for review are with the Northern Territory, South Australian, 
Victorian and Western Australia police forces. Queensland signed a Head Agreement on 24 July 
2013. New South Wales has not yet signed a Head Agreement with the AFP.  
84  However, the AFP advised that 13 of these instruments were awaiting feedback from, or agreement 
with, another agency. 
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internal  and  external  committees.  Internal  committees  comprise  senior AFP 
members who meet regularly  to discuss both strategic and operational  issues 
relevant  to  the  AFP’s  policing  function  at  airports.  External  committees 




3.27 The  AFP  holds  regular  formal  committee  meetings  to  discuss  both 
strategic and operational  issues  impacting on  the Aviation  function. The key 
meetings  are  the  Aviation  Executive  Committee,  the  Aviation  Operations 
Committee  and  the  Aviation  Risk  Management  Committee.85  The  Aviation 
Executive  Committee  and  the  Aviation  Operations  Committee  are  held 





were  operating  as  intended, with  the minutes  for  both  committees  showing 
that  the discussions held were consistent with  the  role of  the committee. For 
example,  key  issues  covered  by  the Aviation Executive Committee  included 
Project Macer and Program Jupiter, as well as discussion of policing strategies 
at airports to manage upcoming events such as the G20 meeting in Brisbane in 
2014.  Key  issues  covered  in  the  Aviation  Operations  Committee  included 
briefings  on  ongoing  investigations  and  intelligence  reports  from  each  of 




85  The Aviation Executive Committee has been held since September 2012. During the Executive 
Committee meeting on 6 September 2012, it was decided to amalgamate parts of the Aviation 
Monitoring and Oversight Committee with the Aviation Operations Committee. The Aviation 
Operations Committee has been in its current format since November 2012. 
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National aviation security committees  
3.29 There  are  a  number  of  external  aviation  security  forums  for  airport 
stakeholders  that  occur  at  both  a  national  level  (strategic)  and  local  airport 
level  (operational).  The  Australian  Government  Transport  Security  Policy 
Committee  is  the  key  Federal  Government  committee  focused  on  aviation 
security. This committee, together with the Aviation Security Advisory Forum, 
provide relevant government and industry stakeholders with the opportunity 
to  discuss  aviation  security  matters  at  a  national  level.  The  roles  of  the 
committees are outlined in Appendix 3. 
Airport security committees 
3.30 Stakeholders at the local airport level86 are able to discuss local security 
issues  through  the  Australian  Government  Agency  Airport  Security 
Committee  (AGAASC);  the  Airport  Security  Committee;  and  the  Airport 
Security  Consultative  Group,  which  are  held  at  each  of  the  10 designated 
airports. These committees provide a forum for information sharing. They also 
assist  in  identifying  and  mitigating  vulnerabilities  and  threats.  Discussions 
focusing  on  future  known  events  (such  as  VIP  movements  or  terminal 
refurbishments)  allows  resourcing  issues  to  be  adjusted.  Finally,  these 
committees  provide  a  forum  to  debrief  incidents  that  have  occurred  and 
provide  an  opportunity  to  learn  lessons  and,  if  necessary,  revise  standing 
operating  procedures  and/or  emergency  plans  and  responses.  The  specified 
roles of these committees are also outlined in Appendix 3. 
3.31 The  ANAO  examined  the  2012–13  minutes  from  the  AGAASC  for 








86  With the exception of Hobart, where there are no other Australian government agencies present. 
87  The Australian Government Agency Airport Security Committee is not held at Hobart airport due to the 
absence of other Commonwealth Government agencies. 
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86  With the exception of Hobart, where there are no other Australian government agencies present. 
87  The Australian Government Agency Airport Security Committee is not held at Hobart airport due to the 
absence of other Commonwealth Government agencies. 
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3.32 The  key  issues  covered  in  these  committee  meetings  focused  on 
national  aviation  security matters,  such  as  laser  light  interference  or media 
coverage at airports. Government agencies present at AGAASC meetings, such 
as  the  Department  of  Immigration  and  Border  Protection,  the  Australian 
Customs  and  Border  Protection  Service,  and  DIRD  provided  high‐level 
briefings on relevant national security and border control issues. 
3.33 The ANAO  also  examined  a  sample  of minutes  for  2012–13  for  the 
Airport Security Committee and Airport Security Consultative Group, which 
are both  chaired by  the airport owners.89 For  the meeting minutes  reviewed, 
the  AFP  was  well  represented  and  participated  in  each  meeting.  Issues 
discussed at these committee meetings ranged from the AFP reporting on the 




Strategic and operational planning 
3.34 The AFP  undertakes  strategic  and  operational  planning  agency‐wide 
and for each individual business area within the AFP. At a strategic level, the 
AFP  has  a  high‐level  corporate  Strategic  Plan,  while  each  business  area, 
including  Aviation,  is  required  to  have  a  Business  Plan.  At  an  operational 







88  Darwin airport advised the ANAO that an AGAASC meeting was not held between May 2012 and 
January 2013 due to the re-alignment of the timing of the AGAASC to be consistent with that of the 
Australian Government Transport Security Policy Committee. However, this re-alignment was advised 
in July 2012 and other airports were able to re-align their meetings starting from August 2012. Darwin 
did not hold an AGAASC in May 2013. 
 Canberra airport had a gap in AGAASC meetings due to a stakeholder withdrawing and uncertainty 
over the continuation of the committee. A decision was made in late 2012 to continue to hold the 
AGAASC at Canberra airport. 
89  The sample of minutes for the Airport Security Committee and Airport Security Consultative Group 
included minutes from Adelaide, Brisbane, Cairns, Gold Coast, Hobart, Melbourne, Perth and Sydney. 
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other  specific  plans  and  strategies,  as  shown  in  Figure  3.3.  The  ANAO 
reviewed these documents with respect to the Aviation function.90 
                                                     
90  Figure 3.3 also refers to charters of performance and performance development agreements. These 
relate to performance agreements and assessments at individual officer level. The ANAO did not 
examine these agreements. 
  
ANAO Audit Report No.23 2013–14 











other  specific  plans  and  strategies,  as  shown  in  Figure  3.3.  The  ANAO 
reviewed these documents with respect to the Aviation function.90 
                                                     
90  Figure 3.3 also refers to charters of performance and performance development agreements. These 
relate to performance agreements and assessments at individual officer level. The ANAO did not 
examine these agreements. 
Management of AFP Airport Operations 
 
ANAO Audit Report No.23 2013–14 
Policing at Australian International Airports 
 
77 
Figure 3.3: AFP Strategic Plan 2012–2015 
 
Source: AFP. 
Functional Business Plan  
3.37 Aviation’s Functional Business Plan covers the period 2011−14, but it is 
reviewed  annually.  The  most  recent  review  took  place  in  July  2013.  The 
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the  aviation  industry,  government  and  community  stakeholders  to 
better  counter  security  and  criminal  threats  to  the  aviation 
environment; and 
 to  negotiate,  support  and  assist  Commercial  Support91  to  formalise 
leasing agreements with airport owners and developers  for  long  term 
office and canine accommodation. 
3.38 Each goal  is  linked  to one or more of  the seven strategic principles  in 
the  Strategic Plan  as well  as  to  the  specific  risks outlined  in Aviation’s Risk 
Assessment and Treatment Plan  (see paragraph 3.61). The Business Plan also 
assigns  responsibility  for each goal  to  specific  individuals  (such as APCs) or 
functional areas (such as the Operations Committee). 
Operational Planning 
Airport Action Plans 
3.39 Individual Airport Action Plans  reflect  the  same  goals  and  strategies 
outlined in the overall Aviation Functional Business Plan. Of the 29 strategies 
listed in the Functional Business Plan, APCs are responsible for 16. The Airport 
Action Plans provide an opportunity  for APCs  to specify  ‘actions’  to achieve 
the  strategies  for  which  they  are  responsible,  although  it  does  not  appear 
mandatory for them to do so (and most92 had not).  
3.40  The  Airport  Action  Plans  are  used  by  the  APCs  to  report  on  their 
performance against targets set for each of the 16 strategies for which they are 
responsible. The ANAO’s analysis showed that only one airport (Hobart) had 




Business continuity planning 
3.41 The AFP’s approach to business continuity management is outlined in 
the National Guideline on Business Continuity Management, which forms part 
of  the  AFP’s  overall  risk  management  framework.  Under  the  National 
                                                     
91  The Commercial Support area of the AFP is responsible for the property operations of the AFP. 
92  Brisbane, Cairns, Canberra, Darwin, Gold Coast and Perth. 
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Guideline,  business  continuity  plans  (BCPs)  are  required  to  be  reviewed, 





Management. At  the  time of  fieldwork, all BCPs were  current and had been 
reviewed at  least annually, with 10 of  the plans having been  reviewed more 




reports  for  each  airport  which  indicated  that  officers  were  aware  of  their 
responsibilities in an emergency. 
Emergency planning  
3.43 As  part  of  the  aviation  community,  the  AFP  also  has  a  role  in  the 
airport  owners’  emergency  plans.  Under  the  Civil  Aviation  Safety 
Regulations 1998,  aerodromes  that  are  certified  by  the  Civil  Aviation  Safety 
Authority are required  to establish an aerodrome emergency committee94  (on 
which  the AFP  is  represented)  and  have  an  emergency  plan  in  place.95  The 
emergency plans are activated during an emergency event such as an aircraft 
crash, sabotage or bomb threat, unlawful seizure, fire, or natural disaster. Each 
airport  has  an  emergency  plan  and  has  established  an  Airport  Emergency 
Committee, with  the  committee  responsible  for  establishing,  reviewing  and 
maintaining the airport emergency plans. 
3.44 The  ANAO  reviewed  the  10 designated  airports’  emergency  plans 
developed by  the airport owners. The plans  clearly outline  the AFP’s  role  in 
relation  to  aviation  emergency  management  and  show  that  the  AFP  is 
represented on the Airport Emergency Committees.  
                                                     
93  Minimum requirements include listing critical business activities, maximum tolerable periods of 
disruption, minimum staffing requirements, communication approach with stakeholders and recovery 
checklists.   
94  Aviation Security Regulation 139.205. 
95  Aviation Security Regulation 139.210. 
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Threat and risk assessments 
3.45 Threat  and  risk  assessments  are  particularly  important  within  the 
aviation context, as  the methods employed by criminals,  including  terrorists, 
are constantly evolving. From both a global and national perspective, airport 
security remains a primary concern for Australia, so it is important that threats 
and  risks  to airports are  regularly assessed. The ANAO examined  the AFP’s 
approach  to  assessing  and  managing  risk  in  its  Aviation  function,  and  the 
alignment of this approach with threat assessments that have been completed 
in the aviation security environment more generally.  
Threat assessment of airports 
3.46 The  10 designated  airports  are  the  largest  airports  in  terms  of  both 
domestic,  international  and  total  passenger  numbers.  Policing  at 




Evolving risk environment 
3.47 As  the  level  and  type of  threat at  airports  is  constantly  evolving,  the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) issues a highly classified 




Provide  threat  information  for  aviation  and  air  cargo  supply  chain  industry 
participants  to  consider  when  they  are  undertaking  security  planning,  risk 
assessments  and  subsequently  developing  transport  security  programs  for 
their operations in accordance with the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004.  
3.48 The most recent RCS identifies one of the more likely risk events to be 
an  improvised  explosive device  or  armed  assault  against  the  front  of  house 
(FoH) area of an airport.98 The Statement also noted that  ‘FoH areas are often 
                                                     
96  Canberra last received international passengers in August 2004; Hobart in October 1998. 
97  Aviation Security Risk Context Statements were produced in December 2005, February 2009, 
December 2010 and February 2013. 
98  ‘Front of house’ refers to non-screened, publicly accessible areas of airport terminals and their 
surrounds. 
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crowded with  travellers,  airport  employees  and members  of  the public,  and 
unlike aircraft and airside areas, are accessible without screening and without 
the  need  to  purchase  a  ticket,  making  them  particularly  vulnerable  to  a 
terrorist attack with catastrophic consequences.’99  
3.49 In December  2009,  the  then Government  released  a White  Paper  on 
National Aviation  Policy.100  The  Paper  also  highlighted  the  risks  associated 
with the publicly accessible FoH airport areas.  
3.50 The  RCS  and  the  White  Paper  noted  that  receiving  international 
passengers may not be the only factor affecting an airport’s attractiveness as a 
potential  terrorist  target.  Larger  domestic  airports  often  have  crowded  FoH 
areas and could potentially be attractive as a terrorist target. In this context, the 




3.51 The  explanatory  memorandum  to  the  Aviation  Transport  Security 
Regulations  2005, which define which  airports  are designated  airports,  stated 
that they were to be ‘Alice Springs, Cairns, Coolangatta101 and the capital cities 
of  each  State  and Territory’102, but did not  explain  the  basis on which  those 
airports were selected. 
3.52 On  21  September  2005,  the  then  Prime  Minister  issued  a  press 
statement advising that the Government had considered the recommendations 




the  Department  of  Transport  and  Regional  Services  be  required  to  review 
CTFR airports and the major non‐CTFR airports on a regular basis and at least 
                                                     
99  The Statement refers to terrorist attacks against front of house areas at Domodedovo (2011), Glasgow 
(2007), Soekarno-Hatta (2003), Los Angeles (2002), Rome (1988) and Vienna (1988). 
100  Flight Path to the Future: National Aviation Policy White Paper, December 2009. 
101  Coolangatta airport is now known as Gold Coast airport. 
102  A decision was made in December 2011 by the then Government to withdraw the AFP from Alice 
Springs airport. 
103  The Rt Hon Sir John Wheeler DL, An Independent Review of Airport Security and Policing for the 
Government of Australia, September 2005, pp xvii and 58.  
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once  every  three  years  so  as  to  determine  whether  their  classification  is 
appropriate.  
3.53 During  the  audit, DIRD  advised  the ANAO  that development  of  the 
criteria envisaged in the Wheeler review had proved difficult and that ‘no‐one 
has been able  to  come up with a definitive  set of  criteria’.  In April 2006,  the 
then Minister  for  Justice  and  Customs  proposed  that  the  location  of  police 
resources should be  informed by a  risk assessment  rather  than static criteria. 
The then Government agreed and decided that: 
 the determination of which airports require AFP resources be informed 
by  a  risk  assessment  by  DIRD,  to  be  reviewed  in  the  light  of  the 
biennial ASIO aviation threat assessment;  
 that  if  the assessment  indicated a need  for a change  in  the  location of 
police  resources,  the  transport  and  customs  Ministers  would  jointly 
bring forward a proposal in the annual budget context; and 
 that  at  that  time,  there  was  no  requirement  to  increase  the  AFP 
presence at any additional airports. 
3.54 DIRD advised the ANAO that it considers that the RCSs constitute the 
type of risk assessment contemplated by  the  then Government  in April 2006. 
However,  the RCSs do not  address  the  issue  of which  airports  require AFP 
resources. DIRD  further advised  that  it had considered all available material 




of changing patterns  in aviation services  [such as  the establishment of a new 
major airport] is ongoing work for this department’. 
3.55 Notwithstanding  the  then Government’s April  2006 decision  that  the 
location of police  resources  should be  ‘informed by  a  risk  assessment  rather 
than  static  criteria’,  DIRD  proceeded  with  the  development  of  an  Airport 
Classification Assessment Tool (ACAT) in parallel with the RCS. The ACAT is 
a spreadsheet‐based assessment  tool104 which assessed each of Australia’s  top 
30  airports  based  on  passenger  movements.  Each  airport  was  assessed  for 
                                                     
104  The original tool was developed in 2006 by a firm of consultants. 
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of  each  airport’s  layout  and  drew  upon  intelligence  reporting  provided  by 
ASIO.  
3.56 The work  to  prepare  the ACAT,  which  involved  both  the AFP  and 
DIRD, was substantial. The AFP and DIRD provided assistance to each of the 
30 airports in the preparation of a questionnaire and detailed analysis by DIRD 
using  the  purpose‐designed  tool.  Using  a  weighting  system,  an  ‘Airport 
Inherent  Threat  Rating’  was  calculated  for  each  airport.  The  Project 
Completion Report confirmed  that seven of  the 10 airports at which  the AFP 
was  located were assessed as posing  the highest  inherent  risk. However,  the 
report  identified  some  anomalies  in  relation  to  certain  smaller  domestic 
airports  with  two  ‘key  implications  for  the  current  airport  policing 
arrangements’: 
 there is no risk‐based justification for the exclusion of Townsville from 
current  airport  policing  arrangements,  given  that  its  threat  score  is 
comparable to that of Cairns and Darwin; and 
 if Hobart  is  to continue  to host a policing presence based on  its  risk 
profile then Newcastle, Avalon and Rockhampton airports should also 
be  considered  for  inclusion  in  these  arrangements,  given  that  they 
received significantly higher threat scores. 
3.57 The ACAT was  the  subject of high  level  correspondence between  the 
AFP and DIRD and its finalisation was anticipated in discussions with central 
government  agencies. Ultimately,  in  January  2011,  the Executive Director  of 
the Office of Transport Security within DIRD wrote  to  the NMA at  the AFP 
enclosing a copy of the Project Completion Report, noting that: 
I expect  this report could play an  important part  in discussions between our 
two agencies  regarding any  future Government decisions  related  to  security 
regulated airports that may require a policing presence. 
3.58 In September 2013, DIRD advised that the ACAT was now considered 
to  have  ‘no  official  status’.  In  any  case,  since  2011, DIRD  has not  sought  to 
incorporate the ACAT in decision making processes relating to which airports 
should, on  a  risk basis, have  an AFP presence. The AFP  advised  that  in  the 
absence of advice  from DIRD  that  the ACAT had official status,  the AFP did 
                                                     
105  Vehicle-based improvised explosive device, person-borne improvised explosive device, armed 
assault, stand-off attack, chemical, biological and radiological attack, hijack and sabotage. 
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104  The original tool was developed in 2006 by a firm of consultants. 
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not  consider  that  it  could  use  the ACAT  to  assist with  decisions  about  the 
allocation of staff at the 10 currently designated airports. The ANAO considers 
that  the  ACAT  could,  subject  to  further  refinement  and  finalisation,  have 
provided a useful  internal management  tool by which  to assess  the  inherent 
risk of individual airports, as a complement to the higher level RCS. It would 
also assist as an input to the resourcing model which the AFP is developing. 
The AFP’s Risk Management Framework 





 the  AFP  Risk  Assessment  and  Treatment  Plan  template—which 







strategic  risks  and  includes  existing  risk  controls  and  identifies  further 
treatments  to  reduce  the  strategic  risk  levels.  The  SRP,  which  was  last 
reviewed  in  April  2013, outlines  risks  under  five  categories:  safety  and 
wellbeing  of  AFP  employees;  operational  outcomes;  support  capability; 
reputation; and business continuity. 





106  Examples of risks include a reduced capacity to deliver a proactive counter terrorist first response and 
community policing capability, a failure to contribute to safety aboard aircraft and a failure to 
adequately deal with state based offences and public order responses. 
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Manager, Aviation and  includes  the APCs  from  the  four  largest airports. The 
Committee monitors and  reviews alignment between  the Aviation  function’s 
RATP, Business Plan and  the AFP’s SRP. The Committee reports quarterly  to 
the NMA on  risk management. The major  risks  to  the 10 designated airports 
identified by the AFP’s Aviation function include: 
 reduced capacity to deliver CTFR and community policing functions; 
 failure  to  deliver  competent  and  qualified  sworn members with  the 
requisite knowledge,  both Commonwealth  and  state  and  territory,  to 
perform the policing at airport function; 
 failure  to  adequately deal with  state‐based  offences  and public  order 
notices; and 
 inability  to  coordinate  the  Joint  Airport  Investigations  Teams  at  a 
national level. 
Transport Security Program risk context statements 
3.63 As  noted  in  paragraph  1.4,  operators  of  security  controlled  airports 
(including  the  10 designated  airports)  are  required  to  prepare  and  submit  a 
Transport  Security  Program  (TSP)  to  the  Department  of  Infrastructure  and 
Regional Development for approval. ASR 2.09(a) requires operators to include 
in the TSP a  ‘statement outlining the  local security risk context of the airport, 
including  consideration of  its  location  and  seasonal  and operational  factors’. 
The ANAO obtained a  copy of  these  statements  for each airport  from DIRD 
and confirmed that they had been submitted as required by ASR 2.09(a). 
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important  in  this  context  that  intelligence  informs  internal  and  external 
decision making,  and  improves  aviation  security. Consequently,  the ANAO 
examined  the  intelligence  support available  to  the Aviation  function and  the 
information sharing arrangements with state and territory police forces. 
Aviation Intelligence  
3.66 The AFP has defined  intelligence  as  ‘a product derived  from  adding 
value  to  information  to provide  insight  and  influence decision making’. The 




strategic,  operational  and  tactical  intelligence  support  on  issues  relating  to 
national security, organised crime and community crime in the aviation sector. 
Intelligence  is  also provided by  intelligence  staff who  are outposted  to  Joint 




107  Counter Terrorism White Paper: Securing Australia, Protecting Our Community, Department of the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2010 p. 7. 
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107  Counter Terrorism White Paper: Securing Australia, Protecting Our Community, Department of the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2010 p. 7. 
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3.68 Within  the  AFP,  there  are  three  categories  of  intelligence  and 
intelligence products. A summary of these categories and the number of each 
type of report produced in 2012−13 is shown in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3: AFP aviation intelligence report categories and number 
2012−13 
Category Product Number produced 
in 2012−13 
Strategic Strategic Intelligence Report: a product that 
influences high level decision making and can be both 
informative and predictive. Strategic intelligence also 
provides a contextual framework for operational 
activities. 
0 
Operational Operational Intelligence Report: a product that 
influences operational managers in making effective 
decisions regarding resource allocation and 
prioritisation. It provides targeting opportunities and 
identifies convergences between operations. 
Operational intelligence also supports strategic 
intelligence by identifying criminal trends. 
41 
Tactical Tactical Intelligence Report: a product that 




3.69 The  ANAO  examined  a  sample  of  reports  from  each  of  the 
three categories. The reports covered a range of topics such as a strategic crime 
assessment  of  the  designated  airports  and  a  specific  security  vulnerability 
identified  at  one airport  which  was  circulated  to  ascertain  if  the  same 
vulnerability existed at other airports.  In  the ANAO’s view,  the  content was 
topical and timely.  
Joint Airport Intelligence Groups 
3.70 The function of the JAIGs is to provide: 
 operational  intelligence  support  to  Joint Airport  Investigations Teams 
(JAITs)108  through  target  development  and  assessments  of  high  level 
criminality at airports; 
                                                     
108  Joint Airport Investigations Teams (JAITs) complement the functions of JAIGs by providing a specific 
investigations capacity targeting serious and organised crime in the aviation sector. 
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and  crime  information  and  intelligence  products  as  they  affect  the 
Aviation  function,  the  aviation  sector,  airports  and  their  environs 




3.71 JAIGs  (and  JAITs)  were  originally  established  in  2005  following  the 
Wheeler  review.109  It was  intended  that,  in addition  to AFP  intelligence staff, 
they would  include permanent  representatives  from  the Australian Customs 
and Border Protection Service and the local state or territory police force.110 The 
purpose  for  having  state  and  territory  police  represented  on  the  JAIGs  and 
JAITs was that those officers would be able to access their police databases and 
allow ‘fusion’ of intelligence from both the Commonwealth and the states and 
territories.  Pursuant  to  the  2005  agreement  of  the  Council  of  Australian 
Governments  (see  paragraph  1.12),  state  and  territory  police  forces  would 
provide two officers for each of the five JAITS and one officer for each of the 
10 JAIGs. 
3.72 In  2009,  the  Beale  review  found  that  JAITs  and  JAIGs  were  ‘highly 
valuable’  and  were  ‘important  facilitators  of  State−Commonwealth  law 
enforcement  coordination  in  the  airport  environment’. However, during  this 
audit, the ANAO was advised that not all state and territory police forces had 
maintained  a  consistent  presence  on  the  JAIT  and  JAIG  in  their  state.  The 
ANAO  sought  information  on  the  actual  number  of  state/territory  police 
supplied during 2012−13. This is shown in Table 3.4. 
                                                     
109  JAITs are located at the five biggest airports (Adelaide, Brisbane, Melbourne, Perth and Sydney): 
JAIGs are at all airports. 
110  Representatives from the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development, the Australian 
Crime Commission, the Department of Agriculture (responsible for quarantine matters), the 
Department of Immigration and Border Protection and the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation also provide representatives as necessary. 
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Table 3.4: JAIGs and JAITs: number of state/territory officers 
seconded (full time equivalent), 2012−13 
Airport JAIG (commitment: one 
officer) 
JAIT (commitment: two 
officers) 
Adelaide  1 0 
Brisbane 0.51 2 
Cairns 0 Not applicable 
Canberra Not applicable Not applicable 
Darwin 0.92 Not applicable 
Gold Coast 1 Not applicable 
Hobart 1 Not applicable 
Melbourne 1 2 
Perth 0.13 0 
Sydney 0 0 
NOTE 1: Queensland Police supplied one officer for six of the 12 months. 
NOTE 2: Northern Territory Police supplied one officer for 11 of the 12 months. 
NOTE 3: Western Australia Police supplied one officer for one of the 12 months. 
Source: AFP 
3.73 Table  3.4  shows  that  with  respect  to  JAIGS,  only  four  of 
10 state/territory police forces have fully met the commitment and with respect 
to JAITS, only two state/territory police forces have met their commitment. Of 
note  is  that  Sydney  airport,  the  largest  airport, has not been  represented on 
either the JAIT or the JAIG during 2012−13. The AFP advised that there were a 
number of reasons that had been given by state/territory police forces for not 
providing  officers.  In  some  cases,  previous  written  agreements  had  lapsed 
when  state/territory  officers  returned  to  their  ‘home’  police  forces  during 
Project Macer  and new  arrangements had not been made. The AFP  advised 
that APCs at those airports that did not have a consistent state/territory police 
representation  from  time  to  time  raised  the  issue with  their  counterparts.  In 
one case,  the state police  force had advised  that  it could not provide officers 
due to staff shortages. The absence of state/territory police officers from JAITs 
and  JAIGs  impedes  access  to  real‐time  information  from  state  and  territory 
police databases and reduces opportunities for  law enforcement collaboration 
in the airport environment. 
Joint Aviation Intelligence Groups’ support to aviation operations 
3.74 Every two weeks, the Aviation Intelligence group in AFP headquarters 
compiles  a  Fortnightly  Capacity  and  Significant  Operations  (FCSO)  report. 
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summarises  expected  operational  support,  target  development  and  major 
intelligence  projects  on  hand,  current  operational  priorities  and  intelligence 
products  due  for  release.  The ANAO  reviewed  these  reports  for  the  period 
1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013 in order to assess the range and types of intelligence 
support that the JAIGs provide to aviation operations.  
3.75 The  reports  showed  a  wide  range  of  intelligence  support  to  the 
Aviation function. Examples included: 
 an  analysis  of  information  from  an  airport  owner  about  owners  of 
vehicles observed in non‐public areas of airport; 
 an  investigation  into  an  aviation  industry  employee  who  received 
multiple substantial funds transfers from overseas; 




 liaison  with  Customs  to  arrange  for  examination  of  six  passengers 
whose tickets were purchased with a stolen credit card. 
3.76 The  ANAO’s  analysis  of  the  2012−13  Fortnightly  Capacity  and 
Significant  Operations  reports  showed  that  there  were  49  instances  where 





the  Australian  Government  Agency  Airport  Security  Committee 
meeting and the Airport Security Committee; 
 photographs of persons of interest which are distributed to all airports; 
 the  Aviation  function’s  contribution  to  the  2013  AFP  Annual 
Intelligence Assessment; and 
 briefs on possible emerging aviation crime and/or security issues (such 
as,  for  example,  images  of  a  folding  knife  resembling  a  credit  card 
which was found in a passenger’s wallet). 
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Client satisfaction with Intelligence 
3.78 Aviation Intelligence supplies its products to both internal AFP clients 
and  to  a  number  of  external  agencies,  including  state  and  territory  police 
forces,  other  law  enforcement  agencies  (such  as  the  Australian  Crime 
Commission) and airport owners and operators. All strategic, operational and 
tactical  intelligence  reports  contain  an  evaluation  sheet which  readers of  the 
reports are requested to complete and return to Intelligence. The AFP advised 
that  in  practice,  it  receives  very  few  completed  evaluation  sheets  but  this 







Intelligence.  This  was  the  same  result  as  for  the  Intelligence  function  as  a 
whole. 
Crime mapping 
3.80 Aviation  Intelligence  is  presently  developing  a  crime  mapping 
initiative  for  airports.  This  initiative  uses  advanced  interactive  mapping 
software to map all policing  incidents which occur at airports on a geospatial 
map  of  the  airport. Related  software, Crime  Profiler,  allows  information  on 
crime  patterns  at  airports  to  be  analysed  to  assist  in  the  more  effective 
deployment of resources and identification of crime ‘hotspots’.  
Conclusion 
3.81 The  organisational  arrangements  underpinning  airport  policing  are 
sound, with  the decentralised  approach providing APCs with  autonomy  for 
the  policing  of  airports  and  regions.  The  AFP’s  regular  involvement  in  a 
number  of  external  aviation  committees  provides  the AFP with  stakeholder 
views and a broader perspective on aviation security issues. Internal reporting 
structures are  in place, with  formal monthly  internal management committee 
meetings  allowing  the Aviation  Executive  to  have  an  understanding  of  the 
issues  arising  in  the  aviation  environment  and  across  all  airports.  The AFP 
Strategic  Plan,  the  Functional  Business  Plan  and  Airport  Action  Plans  are 
broadly  aligned,  although  some  airport  plans  were  incomplete  in  some 
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3.82 The 10 airports at which  the AFP maintains a presence were  initially 
designated by government  in 2005. DIRD considers that, notwithstanding the 




been  documented.  Further,  despite  developing  a  detailed  threat  assessment 
tool  for  individual airports, neither DIRD nor  the AFP has sought  to use  this 





at  each  airport,  the  inherent  risks  presented  by  each  airport,  including 
passenger  and  aircraft  movements  and  the  level  of  criminality,  are  not 
explicitly  taken  into  account.  It  is  timely  that  the  AFP  completes  and 
implements  its proposed resourcing model that takes these factors, as well as 
threat  levels,  origin  of  aircraft,  hours  of  airport  operation  and  airport 
geospatial  data  into  account,  providing  a more  disciplined  approach  to  the 
allocation of resources across airports.  
3.84 The  role  of  Intelligence  in  airport  policing  is  well  articulated  and 
intelligence  staff  are  embedded  in  JAIGs  at  each  airport.  The  Intelligence 
function  produces  a  range  of  useful  strategic,  operational  and  tactical 
intelligence products which relate to the AFP’s counter terrorism, serious and 
organised  crime  and  community  policing  roles  at  the  airports.  There  is 
evidence  that  the work  of  the  JAIGs  leads  to  practical  outcomes,  including 
arrests, summonses and cautions. 
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4. The Aviation Function’s 
Performance  
This  chapter  examines  the measurement  and  reporting  of  the AFP’s performance  in 




4.1 Australian government agencies,  including  the AFP, have reported on 
their  performance  since  at  least  the  mid  1980s.  Performance  reporting 
requirements have  evolved over  time, but  the purpose  remains  the  same:  to 
allow  the  Parliament,  the  public  and  agency  stakeholders  to  assess  the 
effectiveness of an agency’s operations and how public funds are being used to 
achieve legislative requirements and government policy objectives. Within the 
AFP,  the Aviation  function’s objective  is  that  it  ‘will prevent and  respond  to 
crime  at  major  airports  by  providing  an  AFP  sworn  police  capability  to 
perform a Counter Terrorist First Response and community policing role’.  
4.2 A  key  part  of  the Aviation  function’s  community  policing  role  is  to 
respond  to  incidents  as  and when  they  occur  at  airports. While  an  incident 
may not always lead to a specific outcome, more serious incidents may result 
in  a  person  being  apprehended  or  arrested.  The AFP  records  incidents  and 
their outcomes and the analysis of this information serves to provide a picture 
of the AFP’s operational tempo at the 10 designated airports. 
4.3 The  ANAO  examined  trends  in  the  Aviation  function’s  workload 
indicators and statistics and  its performance against existing KPIs. The views 
of  key  stakeholders were  also  canvassed  and  the  complaints  received  about 
AFP officers at airports examined.  
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person or persons  involved are  interviewed  to establish  the circumstances of 
the  incident. An  apprehension  can  also have  a variety of outcomes,  ranging 
from no  further action being  taken,  to arrest where an officer has  reasonable 
grounds to believe that an offence has occurred.113  
4.5 As with all areas of the AFP, the Aviation function records all incidents, 
apprehensions  and  arrests  occurring  at  airports.  Table  4.1  summarises  the 
number of  incidents, apprehensions and arrests for each of the 10 airports for 
the three years from 2010−11 to 2012−13. 
Table 4.1: Incidents, apprehensions and arrests at designated airports 
for the period July 2010 to June 2013 
Airport Incidents Apprehensions Arrests 
Adelaide  3 911 647 83 
Brisbane 9 248 911 173 
Cairns 1 813 578 38 
Canberra 3 435 150 14 
Darwin 2 942 494 63 
Gold Coast 2 092 264 41 
Hobart 1 233 796 19 
Melbourne 17 213 1 077 217 
Perth 6 687 526 81 
                                                     
111  When the AOCC (located in Canberra) receives a report of an incident, the time of the call is 
automatically recorded. The AOCC operator refers the nature and location of the incident (and its 
priority rating from 1 (most urgent) to 4 (least urgent)) by radio to an officer at the airport. When the 
officer arrives ‘on scene’, he or she reports this to the AOCC where the time is again automatically 
recorded. This allows the time taken for every incident to be accurately recorded. 
112  Officers may also encounter incidents in the course of patrolling. If such an incident requires recording 
in PROMIS, officers will make contemporaneous notes and are then required to make an entry into 
PROMIS. Officers can exercise discretion as to whether a matter requires recording.  
113  Although the AFP has temporary holding facilities at each airport, these are not suitable for use for 
more than a limited period of time. Under arrangements with each state and territory, the AFP will 
transfer arrested persons to a watch house in the local jurisdiction for detention while decisions are 
made about charging and bail. 
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Airport Incidents Apprehensions Arrests 
Sydney 14 863 2 421 206 
Total 63 437 7 864 935 
Source: ANAO analysis of AFP data. 
Incidents 
Incident types 
4.6 Each  incident  recorded  in  PROMIS  is  classified  according  to  one  of 
71 pre‐determined incident types. These can vary from the most serious, such 
as  a  death  (of  which  there  were  29  recorded  for  the  10 airports  for  the 
three year period) to relatively trivial, such as assisting a member of the public 
with directions. Figure  4.1  shows  the 10 most  common  incident  types at  the 
airports between 2010−11 and 2012−13. 
Figure 4.1: Top 10 incident types at designated airports for the period 
July 2010 to June 2013  
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4.7 The  45  406  ‘top  10’  incidents  shown  in Figure  4.1  account  for  almost 
72 per cent of all recorded incidents for the three year period July 2010 to June 





response. Figure  4.2  shows  the proportions of Priority One, Two, Three  and 
Four incidents at each airport. 
Figure 4.2: Proportion of incidents by priority rating at designated 
airports for the period July 2010 to June 2013  
 
Source: ANAO analysis of AFP data. 
4.9 As  might  be  expected,  Priority  One  incidents  comprise  a  relatively 
smaller proportion  than  less urgent  incidents. The proportion of Priority One 
incidents was broadly consistent across  the 10 airports, with  the exception of 
Cairns  (14.3  per  cent), where  they were markedly  higher  than  the  national 
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Figure 4.3: Top 10 Priority One incidents at designated airports for the 
period July 2010 to June 2013 
 
Source: ANAO analysis of AFP data. 
NOTE:  1. A masterminder alarm is a computer generated alarm monitoring system located in the AOCC. 
 2. CBR means chemical, biological or radioactive material. 
Incident trends 
4.11 Figure 4.4 shows the trend in the number of incidents at the 10 airports 
over  the period. There  is  a  noticeable peak  in  the December/January period 
each year which  coincides with  increased passenger numbers at  that  time of 
                                                     
115  The AFP advised that since AFP officers at Cairns airport cannot apply Queensland state legislation, 
there is a larger number of incidents relating to matters covered by Commonwealth legislation, such as 
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year. Overall,  the  number  of  incidents  has  increased  slightly  from  21 023  in 
2010−11 to 22 378 in 2012−13. 
Figure 4.4: Monthly trend in the number of incidents at designated 
airports for the period July 2010 to June 2013  
 
Source: ANAO analysis of AFP data. 
4.12 There  has  been  significantly more  variation  in  the  trend  in  incident 
numbers at  individual airports. The number of  incidents  increased at  five of 






period  2010−11  to  2012−13.  People  are  generally  apprehended  for  further 
questioning where an officer believes that an offence has been committed and, 
as  previously  noted,  an  apprehension  may  have  a  variety  of  outcomes, 
                                                     
116  At the Gold Coast, the largest increases in incident types were ‘Assist police/agency/public’ (which 
increased 214.6 per cent from 82 in 2010–11 to 258 in 2012–13) and ‘Disturbance – minor’ (which 












































































ANAO Audit Report No.23 2013–14 
Policing at Australian International Airports 
 
98 
year. Overall,  the  number  of  incidents  has  increased  slightly  from  21 023  in 
2010−11 to 22 378 in 2012−13. 
Figure 4.4: Monthly trend in the number of incidents at designated 
airports for the period July 2010 to June 2013  
 
Source: ANAO analysis of AFP data. 
4.12 There  has  been  significantly more  variation  in  the  trend  in  incident 
numbers at  individual airports. The number of  incidents  increased at  five of 






period  2010−11  to  2012−13.  People  are  generally  apprehended  for  further 
questioning where an officer believes that an offence has been committed and, 
as  previously  noted,  an  apprehension  may  have  a  variety  of  outcomes, 
                                                     
116  At the Gold Coast, the largest increases in incident types were ‘Assist police/agency/public’ (which 
increased 214.6 per cent from 82 in 2010–11 to 258 in 2012–13) and ‘Disturbance – minor’ (which 











































































The Aviation Function’s Performance 
 
ANAO Audit Report No.23 2013–14 






of  incidents  over  the  three  years  2010−11  to  2012−13.  In  relation  to 
apprehensions, however, there has been a small decrease over the same period 
(from 2928 in 2010−11 to 2441 in 2012−13). This trend is shown in Figure 4.5. 
Figure 4.5: Monthly trend in the number of apprehensions at 
designated 10 airports for the period July 2010 to June 2013  
 




offences).  Of  these  arrests,  329  (35.4 per cent)  were  made  under 
Commonwealth  legislation  and  599  (64.6 per cent)  were  made  under 
state/territory  legislation.118 Of  the  arrests  under Commonwealth  legislation, 
                                                     
117  The most common apprehensions were cautions (2860), arrest (1422), infringement notice (1243) and 
summons to appear in court (920). These four outcomes accounted for 78.6 per cent of all 
apprehension outcomes. 
118  Seven arrests included in the AFP data did not specify whether they were made under Commonwealth 
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126 (38.3 per cent) were  for matters  relating  to  aviation  or  aircraft  security119 
and  118 (35.9 per cent)  were  for  matters  relating  to  prohibited  imports  or 
exports.120 Of  the  599  arrests made  under  state  and  territory  legislation,  the 






number  of  arrests  increased  by  42.6 per cent  from  272  in  2010−11  to  388  in 
2012−13.121 
Figure 4.6: Monthly trend in the number of arrests at designated 
airports for the period July 2010 to June 2013  
 
Source: ANAO analysis of AFP data. 
                                                     
119  These included 20 arrests for ‘offensive/disorderly behaviour in an aircraft’, 16 arrests for ‘assaulting 
crew’, 16 arrests for ‘obstruct/hinder/intimidate/resist Commonwealth official’, 10 arrests for ‘enter 
airside area without permission’ and 10 arrests for ‘threat/statement to commit act of unlawful 
interference with aviation’. 
120  One hundred and twelve of these arrests related to drugs or drug precursors. 
121  The AFP reports the numbers of incidents and arrests in its annual reports. There are small variations 
between the data contained in those reports and the data reported here, primarily due to the fact that 
data contained in PROMIS may be updated and revised. However, the AFP advised that as a result of 
the audit, it had identified an error in the number of arrests reported in its 2010–11 annual report (the 
figure reported was 471 but should have been 293). In accordance with requirements for annual 
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on  staffing  allocations  at  and  between  airports  and  to  refine  strategies  or 
develop new approaches to address emerging issues. 
Key Performance Indicators 




use  Key  Performance  Indicators  as  a  way  of  measuring  how  well  the 
deliverables have contributed to an outcome.  
The Aviation function’s KPIs 
4.19 As  previously  discussed  in  Chapter  1,  prior  to  the  government’s 
acceptance  of  the Wheeler  review  in  2005,  the AFP’s  involvement  in  airport 
policing was  limited  to  providing CTFR,  as  part  of  the  Protection  function. 
Aviation was  established  as  a  separate  functional  unit  in  2005−06.  Between 
2005−06 and 2008−09,  the Aviation  function’s KPIs varied  from year  to year, 
making analysis of performance across this period difficult.122  
4.20 Table  4.2  outlines  the  Aviation  function’s  current  KPIs,  targets  and 
results for the years 2009−10 to 2012−13. 
                                                     
122  For example, in 2006–07, the number of ‘new cases’ was reported but was not reported in 2007–08. 
The ‘number of resource hours delivered’ was reported in 2007–08 but was not reported in following 
years. In any event, measures such as these are either a measure of resource input or a simple 
activity measurement and were not linked to a specific target. 
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Table 4.2: Aviation function KPIs, targets and results 2009−10 to 
2012−13 








1. Level of community 
confidence in the contribution of 
the AFP to aviation law 
enforcement and security 
(per cent) 
70/76 75/77 75/82 75/86 
2. Proportion of resources used 
to undertake proactive and 
intelligence-led 
counter-terrorism, crime 
management, public order and 
first response operations 
(per cent) 
70/84 70/93 70/95 70/90 
3. Response to aviation law 
enforcement and/or security 
incidents in accordance with 
priority response times (per 
cent): 
    
Priority One: within five 
minutes 
75/81 75/83 75/82 75/85 
  within 10 
minutes 
90/95 90/97 90/97 90/97 
Priority Two: within 15 
minutes 
75/91 75/92 75/94 75/92 
  within 20 
minutes 
90/96 90/96 90/97 90/95 
Priority Three: within 90 
minutes 
75/99 75/99 75/100 75/99 
  within 120 
minutes 
90/100 90/99 90/100 90/100 
Priority Four: within 24 hours 90/100 90/100 90/100 90/100 
NOTE 
1. Shaded numbers indicate where result was less than previous year. 
Source: ANAO analysis of AFP data. 
4.21 Table  4.2  shows  that  for  a  number  of  KPIs,  the  result  achieved  has 
shown  a  small  decrease  over  the  previous  year.  However,  the  result  has 
consistently exceeded the target for all KPIs for each of the four years shown. 
These  figures  would  suggest  that,  despite  the  reduction  in  airport  staffing 
levels  following  the  introduction of  the  ʹAll  Inʹ model,  the Aviation  function 
has been able to meet its KPIs. 
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levels  following  the  introduction of  the  ʹAll  Inʹ model,  the Aviation  function 
has been able to meet its KPIs. 
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4.22 In  the  ANAO’s  assessment,  KPIs  One  and  Three  are  appropriate.123 
However, KPI Two  is not  readily understandable. The AFP advised  that  this 
KPI measures the proportion of time devoted to patrol activity as opposed to 
responding  to specific  incidents. While  this  information may be of use  to  the 
AFP as a work  flow management  tool,  it  is more a measure of activity rather 
than a measure of police effectiveness. 
4.23 When  assessed  overall,  KPIs  should  allow  for  the  assessment  of  a 
program. The ANAO considers that the Aviation function’s KPIs do not fully 
meet  this  expectation.  For  example,  while  KPIs  One  and  Three  include  a 
measure of the AFP’s response to crime, none of the measures assess the AFP’s 
crime prevention initiatives, which forms part of the overall program objective.  
Review of KPIs 






service  delivery’.  This  review  is  to  be  conducted  in  three  stages  between 
July 2013  and  May  2015,  with  the  first  stage,  revising  current  KPIs,  to  be 
completed by April 2014.  
                                                     
123  This assessment is based on an assessment of the relevance, reliability and completeness of the 
KPIs. These criteria were developed by the ANAO to assist in its statutory power to undertake audits 
of the appropriateness of agencies’ KPIs and their reporting against those indicators. 
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Relationships with stakeholders 
4.25 In discharging  its  functions at airports,  the AFP  is required  to  interact 
with a wide range of stakeholders. The Aviation  function’s ability  to develop 
and maintain effective relationships, particularly with key stakeholders, is also 
seen as an  indicator of  its effectiveness. Key stakeholders  include: Australian, 
state  and  territory  government  agencies;  aviation  services  providers,  retail 
outlets, airlines, airport owners/operators and the general public. 
Surveys of stakeholders 
4.26 Each  year,  the  AFP  commissions  market  research  organisations  to 
undertake  surveys  of  its  stakeholders. One  survey,  the Business  Satisfaction 
Survey,  covers  all  areas  of  the  AFP  (including  the  Aviation  function).  The 
other,  the  Airport  Consumer  Confidence  Survey,  surveys  members  of  the 
travelling public. 
Business Satisfaction Survey 
4.27 The 2013 Business Satisfaction Survey included the Aviation function’s 
clients from each of the 10 airports as well as an assessment of the performance 
of  the Aviation  function  as  a whole. The AFP provided  the market  research 
organisation  with  a  list  of  261  potential  respondents  out  of  a  total  of 
83 organisations.124  In  relation  to  airport‐specific  respondents,  there  were 
116 respondents across the 10 airports. Of those respondents, 96 per cent stated 
that  they were satisfied or very satisfied with  their dealings with  the AFP. In 
relation  to  the Aviation  function  as  a whole,  95 per cent  of  133  respondents 
stated that they were satisfied or very satisfied.  
Airport Consumer Confidence Survey 
4.28 The  Airport  Consumer  Confidence  Survey  involves  interviewing 
approximately  2000  domestic  or  international  travellers  at  the  six  largest 
airports.125 The ‘headline’ overall satisfaction indicator has increased in each of 
the  last  three years  (from 77 per  cent  in 2011  to 86 per  cent  in 2013). Of  the 
                                                     
124  These included Australian and state/territory government agencies (including all police forces), all 
airport operators, a number of airlines, airport security screening companies and a number of other 
companies involved in the aviation industry. 
125  Adelaide, Brisbane, Canberra, Melbourne, Perth and Sydney. 
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ANAO consultations with key stakeholders 
4.29 Among the AFP’s stakeholders, two of the most important in relation to 
day  to day operations are  the airport operators and  the  state/territory police 
forces.  The  ANAO  wrote  to  seven  state/territory  police  forces127  and  the 
operators  of  the  10  airports  seeking  their  views  and  comments  on  the 
effectiveness of  their relationships with  the AFP. During  the  fieldwork phase 
of  the  audit,  the  ANAO  also  interviewed  representatives  of  the  airport 
operators  in  Sydney,  Canberra,  Brisbane,  Melbourne,  the  Gold  Coast  and 
Darwin and state/territory police forces in New South Wales, Queensland and 
the Northern Territory. 
4.30 All  seven  state/territory  police  forces  stated  that  they  had  good 
working  relationships  and  did  not  identify  any  significant  operational, 
jurisdictional, legislative or other impediments to effective policing at airports. 
4.31 Similarly, the six airport operators with whom the ANAO met reported 
that  they  had  effective  working  relationships  with  the  AFP.  However, 
three operators  stated  that  they  did  not  have  a  clear  understanding  of  the 
Aviation  function’s  strategy  for  airport  policing.  For  example,  two  airport 
operators stated  that  they had on occasion observed AFP officers conducting 
roadworthiness checks on vehicles in airport car parks or conducting random 
breath  tests  on  airport  access  roads  and  did  not  understand  how  this  was 
relevant to airport security. 
4.32 The  AFP  has  developed  an  ‘Australian  Federal  Police  Aviation 
Doctrine’ which  contains a  section entitled  ‘Strategies  for enhancing aviation 
security and preventing and defeating crime’. This section identifies the types 
of  criminal  threats  and  critical  points  at  airports  and  sets  out  a  number  of 
prevention,  response  and  special  operations  that  may  be  conducted.  The 
Doctrine was originally produced for internal use within the AFP. In the light 
of  the  feedback  provided  by  airport  operators,  the  ANAO  considers  that 
                                                     
126  These were the percentage who: were aware that the AFP are present at all international airports; saw 
an AFP officer on the day of the survey or on a previous visit; felt that their safety and security is being 
looked after; felt that the AFP presence deters crime; and believed that the AFP is doing a 
professional job. 
127  Not including the Australian Capital Territory, where the AFP provides policing services. 
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circulation  of  this  document  among  key  stakeholders would  assist  them  to 
better  understand  how  the  AFP’s  activities  at  airports  contribute  to  both 
aviation  security  and  to detection  and prevention  of various  types  of  crime. 
The AFP advised that it would update the doctrine to reflect the ʹAll Inʹ model 
and circulate it to appropriate stakeholders. 
Potential impact of the proposed cost recovery on relationships 
with stakeholders 
4.33 In the 2012−13 Budget, the then Government announced its intention to 
recover  costs associated with  community policing at  the designated airports. 
The measure was  estimated  to  generate  revenue  of  $118.1 million  over  the 
period 2013−14 to 2015−16 and it was anticipated that the method of recovery 
would  be  from  the  10  airport  operators  based  on  the  number  of  passenger 
movements  through each airport.  In  the event,  legislation giving effect  to  the 
measure  was  not  introduced  before  the  Parliament  was  prorogued  on 
5 August 2013 prior to the 2013 election.128 
4.34 A number of airport operators advised  the ANAO  that  they  strongly 
opposed  the  proposed  cost  recovery measure  and  the ANAO  also  received 
correspondence  on  airport  operators’  behalf  from  the  Australian  Airports 
Association  (AAA).129  The  AAA  advised  that  if  airport  operators  are  to  be 
expected to contribute to the cost of airport policing, they would expect to have 
some input into issues such as the level of police resources at airports and the 
types  of  activities  officers  undertake.  Through  the  AAA,  airport  operators 
expressed  the  view  that  they  would  wish  to  enter  into  a  service  level 
agreement  (including how AFP  functions are performed and measured) with 
the AFP to address these issues. The AFP advised the ANAO that it was aware 
of  these views, but  ‘does not  see  the need  for  service  level agreements  to be 
implemented as our performance  is measured by Government and  relates  to 
the  entire  security  footprint  at  the  airport  not  just  the  community  policing 
facet’. 
                                                     
128  At the time of audit, the new Government has not announced whether it intends to proceed with the 
measure. 
129  The AAA’s website states that ‘The Australian Airports Association (AAA) is the national voice for 
Australian Airports that represents the interests of over 250 airports and aerodromes across Australia, 
from regional landing strips to major international gateway airports’. 
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4.35 Any  decision  to  adopt  a  cost  recovery  approach  for  community 
policing  at  designated  airports would  be  a matter  for  government  and  the 
Parliament.  
Complaints against police 
4.36 Part  V  of  the  AFP  Act  1979  (the  Act)  deals  with  AFP  professional 
standards  and  AFP  conduct  and  practices  issues.  The  Act  provides  for 
four categories  of  conduct  issues:  Category  One  (the  least  serious)  to 
Category 4 (corruption). Categories One  to Three are  investigated by  the AFP 
while Category 4  issues are referred to the Australian Commissioner for Law 
Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI).130 
4.37 All  complaints  received  by  the  AFP  are  referred  initially  to  a  unit 
within  the AFP known as Professional Standards  (PRS).131 Category One and 
Two conduct  issues  are  referred  to  a  Complaint  Management  Team  (CMT) 





issues  relating  to  the Aviation  function  for  the  last  three financial years  (see 
Table 4.3). 
Table 4.3: Complaints and conduct issues, 10 airports 2010−11 to 
2012−13 
Year Complaints  Conduct issues 
2010−11 57 118 
2011−12 47 83 
2012−13 36 62 
Total 140 263 
Source: AFP. 
                                                     
130  The ACLEI may investigate Category 4 issues itself or refer them back to the AFP for investigation. 
131  Complaints received from members of the public make up approximately half of complaints received. 
However, AFP officers are required to report other officers who they believe may have contravened 
the AFP’s professional standards and these make up the balance of complaints received. 
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4.39 Table  4.3  shows  that  from  2010−11  to  2012−13,  there  has  been  a 
significant drop in the number of both complaints (36.8 per cent) and conduct 
issues  (47.5  per  cent).  The  number  of  complaints  in  2012−13  equates  to 
approximately one complaint per 900 000 passengers.132 
4.40 For  the  69  established  conduct  issues  finalised  in  2012−13,  the  AFP 
provided details about  the nature of  these  issues where  there was more  than 
one issue during the 2012−13 year. These are shown in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4: Most common established conduct issues of finalised 
complaints 2012−13 
Conduct issue Number established 
Fail to comply with direction or procedure1 18 
Information misuse 8 
Discourtesy 7 
Inappropriate behaviour/conduct 6 
Property accounting failure 5 
Fail to record or report 5 
Inappropriate behaviour/conduct (serious in nature) 3 
Driving misconduct 3 
Criminal conduct 2 
Total 572 
NOTE 
1. ‘Fail to comply with direction or procedure’ is one where the ‘complainant’ is another AFP officer, since 
a member of the public is not able to give a police officer a direction nor require him or her to comply with 
a procedure. 
2. Twelve instances where there was only one conduct issue established are not included here. 
Source: AFP. 
4.41 In  2012−13,  the overall number of  complaints  and  associated  conduct 
issues  arising  at  airports  (36  and  62  respectively)  compares  favourably with 
ACT Policing which had 229 complaints and 419 conduct  issues  in  the  same 
year. Considering  the  type  of  incidents  encountered  by  the AFP  at  airports 
                                                     
132  Under certain circumstances, the AFP may use its discretion not to proceed to investigate certain 
complaints. These circumstances are set out in section 40TF of the Australian Federal Police Act 1979 
and include where the matter is more than twelve months old, where appropriate action has already 
been taken or where the complaints is frivolous or vexatious. The delegation not to proceed to 
investigate is limited to a very small number of senior AFP officers. 
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Ombudsman  (who  is also  the Law Enforcement Ombudsman)  to conduct an 
annual  inspection of PRS  records. The Ombudsman  is  required  to prepare a 
report  of  his  review  for  the  Parliament,  including  his  comments  as  to  the 
comprehensiveness  and  adequacy  of  PRS’  handling  of  complaints,  to  assess 
whether PRS uses a  fair and  reasonable  complaints process and whether  the 
outcomes of complaints were reasonable. 
4.43 The Ombudsman’s most recent report covered the period 1 July 2012 to 
30 June 2013.  The  Ombudsman  reviewed  183  complaints  out  of 














routine analysis of  its workload  indicator data  to assist with decisions about 
the allocation of resources across airports.  
4.45 The  AFP’s  PBSs  contain  three  KPIs  for  the  Aviation  function.  The 
Aviation function has consistently met and exceeded the targets for these KPIs. 
Two of  the KPIs  (level of community confidence  (as measured by an annual 
survey)  and  the  time  taken  to  respond  to  incidents  of  varying  urgency)  are 
indicative  of  Aviation’s  performance.  However,  the  third  (proportion  of 
resources used  for patrol activity as distinct  from  responding  to  incidents)  is 
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KPIs have not been  reviewed  since 2008 and  the AFP’s  current Performance 
Framework Reform  project  provides  an  opportunity  to  review  the Aviation 
function’s  KPIs  and  to  consider  the  introduction  of  measures  which  better 
assess  the  Aviation  function’s  performance  (such  as  its  crime  prevention 
activities). 
4.46 The  Aviation  function  enjoys  generally  good  relationships  with  its 
stakeholders, as demonstrated by the annual surveys it conducts and feedback 
provided  to  the ANAO. However,  some  stakeholders would  value  a  clearer 
articulation of the AFP’s airport policing strategy.  
4.47 There has been a reduction in the number of complaints made against 
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Appendix 1: Agency Response to the proposed report 
 
COMMISSIONER 
J( February 2014 GPO Box 40 1, Canberra ACT 2601 Australia Telephone + 61 2 6131 5600 Facsimile+61 2 6132 6600 www.afp.gov.au 
A8N1186ot93t 143 
Mr Ian McPhee PSM 
Auditor-General 
Australian National Audit Office 
GPO Box 707 
CANBERRA ACT 2601 
Dear L~ 
AUDIT REPORT- POLICING AT AUSTRALIAN INTERNATIONAL 
AIRPORTS 
I refer to correspondence from the Australian National Audit Office 
(ANAO) of 29 January 2014 on the proposed audit report on Policing 
at Australian International Airports. The proposed audit report has 
been provided to the AFP pursuant to sub-section 19(1) of the 
Auditor-General Act 1997. 
As highlighted In the report, Australia's airports make a significant 
contribution to the Australian economy through enabling tourism, freight, 
commerce and passenger movements, in addition to generating 
employment across the aviation sector and beyond. With growth In 
passenger movements forecast to continue, this audit has been timely In 
ensuring that the AFP's management and delivery of policing services across 
Australian International airports Is efficient and effective. 
The AFP welcomes the opportunity to contribute to the ANAO Performance 
Audit, Policing at Australian International Airports and acknowledges the 
commentary provided within the report. The AFP agrees with the 
recommendation contained therein and makes the following comment: 
Kecommendatjon No. 1 - To enable AFP officers to maintain 
appropriate knowledge of state and territory legislative requirements, 
the ANAO recommends that the AFP, in consultation with the relevant 
state and territory police force, reviews the content, duration and 
frequency of the legislative training courses. 
The AFP agrees and accepts the recommendation and 
continues to work closely with State I Territory law 
enforcement to develop the most comprehensive and 
contemporary training packages for each airport, ensuring AFP 
members have the required knowledge to undertake the 
investigation of respective State I Territory related offences 
committed in the airport environment. 
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Should your office require any further assistance in relation to this matter, 
please contact Commander Michael Chew, Manager Aviation (6131 5764) or 




ANAO Audit Report No.23 2013–14 







ANAO Audit Report No.23 2013–14 






Department oflnfra~tructure aud Re:gimwl Deuhipmmt 
FllfiRoferonoe: 131145 
Contact Peter RobllrtMJn 
Ms Barbara Cass 
Group Executive Director · 
Performance Audit Services Group· 
Australian Nati~nal Audit Office 
GPOBox707 




Comments on the proposed audit report on PoHcmg at AustraHan International Airports 
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft audit report Policing at Australian International 
Airports. 
I wish to thank your officers in particular for their assistance during the audit and for taking into 
account comments pro,ided by Mr Wilson in his letter of 5 November 2013. 
I only have one further request- that the report references the Department of Infrastructure and 
Regional Development in place of references to the Office of Transport Security. 
Thank you again for the opportunity to comment. 
Y. our:S sincerely 
MikeMrdak 
~bruary2014 
GPO Box 594 Canberra ACT 2601 Australia • Telephone: 02 6274 7573 • Facsimile: 02 627~ 8166 
Websile: wy,v.,infrastructure.gov.au• ABN 86 267 354 017 
Thll m;ateria1 m~y contain " protected lnlorm~tlon · os 
dell~ed I n A">• latlon Transport S ~~llrl t y Act 1 004 
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Appendix 2: Aviation function committees: role and 
membership 
Table A.1: AFP internal aviation committees 




Reviews and guides strategic direction of the 
aviation business. 
Addresses issues from an aviation perspective, 
not an individual airport perspective. 
Makes decisions on behalf of the aviation 
function and is responsible for implementing the 
decisions. 
Takes a ‘whole of business’ approach, including 




Manager Aviation (Chair) 
APCs Brisbane, 





Coordinates and manages the transactional, 
administrative, policy, operational and 
investigative workflows, priorities and resources 
to assist the Aviation function to meet its 
operational and strategic business plan 
outcomes. 
Provides the chair with relevant advice to 
support the Chair’s accountability to the 
Aviation Executive Committee. 
Manager Aviation (Chair) 
At a minimum, attendees 
will be the Chair, two 
National Coordinators 





Identifies strategic and environmental risk 
management issues. 
Manages identified and emerging risks. 
Monitors compliance with AFP National 
Guideline on Risk Management and reviews 
risk management processes. 






Melbourne, Perth and 
Sydney 
Team Leader Incident 
Preparedness Team 
Source:  ANAO analysis of AFP documentation. 
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Table A.2: Aviation security committees and forums—national level 






 Coordinates a 
whole-of-government approach 
to development and 
implementation of transport 
security policy. 
 Provides a forum to coordinate 
consistency and communication 
in the application of transport 
security policy. 
 Considers crime management 
and policing at airports in 
developing and implementing 
transport security policy. 
 Provides whole-of-government 
coordination and direction as 
necessary to the Australian 











 Shares and discusses views on 
aviation security matters of an 
operational, legal, policy and 
regulatory nature. 
 Oversees a series of working 
groups that consider issues 
relating to identity, cargo, 
training, technology, legislation 




from industry and 
government. 
Source: ANAO analysis of AFP documentation. 
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Table A.3: Aviation security committees and forums—local airport 
level 








(Chaired by AFP 
APC) 
 Identifies and resolves 
issues impacting on the 
local operating 
environment. 
 Facilitates information 
sharing and cooperation 
amongst local agencies. 
 Coordinates government 
agency efforts at 
designated airports. 
 Facilitates a clear and 
consistent understanding of 
government security policy 
and cross-portfolio issues. 
















(Chaired by airport 
corporation) 
Discusses threat and risk areas 
in security and decides upon 
strategies and actions to 
address such issues and 
monitor their implementation. 








airlines, air cargo 
agents. Members 




(Chaired by airport 
corporation) 
Facilitates wide dissemination of 
airport security information that 
comes out of the Airport 
Security Committee. 





Source: ANAO analysis of AFP documentation. 
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